Wayne – interesting points to think about. I think, first, that we need to distinguish between moral and amoral heroism. There may be no supply of the moral version if there is no need for it, but one could always do daring things and perhaps be an amoral hero. Could someone be a potential moral hero? Maybe, although we might have an epistemic problem here (we couldn’t just take her word for it). But while that does matter, it isn’t quite the same (potential heros rightly don’t get medals – they haven’t done anything to deserve them). So I think that most of my point would persist.

Similarly, couldn’t, in the perfect world, we try to manufacture scenarios to act bravely, even when there was no need to? Perhaps there might be a moral prohbition against endangering needlessly, but there is still something brave about “braving” a mountain, and it certainly doesn’t seem immoral to climb a mountain for the sake of climbing it.

Thanks for your post. (I was starting to wonder if there is anyone out there…) Some points in response:

I do not claim that in a perfect or near-perfect society no moral virtues will be exhibited, but just that the top of the pyramid of virtue (and hence of acquiring moral worth) will be absent. I do not spend my life restraining myself from killing, raping or even stealing from people, and it does not take much of an effort to refrain. If I were very poor, the temptation at least to steal would be greater. But that is the point: certain social circumstances require unusual efforts in order to remain good, and other environments are less demanding. In the second type there is simply not much opportunity to acquire very high moral value. So perfection certainly means that everyone is behaving well, but this still does not tell us how difficult it is to do so. If it is fairly easy, then we might have perfection with zero high-moral-value.

I don’t think that the high moral value that I am speaking about is wholly supererogatory. If you lived in certain countries in Europe during WW2 (and were of the right age etc) then arguably you had a duty to fight the Nazis, and would typically have been conscripted. If you were Swiss, however, you had no chance to fight the Nazis as a soldier, for your country was neutral.

Finally, on “Ought imples can” here: I am not saying that anyone who lives in an untaxing moral environment and hence does not attain high moral worth is at fault. She cannot attain it. But that is the point. In some sense it is “bad moral luck” to be fortunate in that way.

Sure there won’t be the good samaritan anymore, but being a good samaritan is a supererogatory duty, and if there are no instances in which we can try to be a good samaritan, we cannot judge a person to be worth less because they never could. Ought implies a can. These people cannot fulfill their supererogatory duties, so we shouldn’t even say that they could be better… they can’t.