I agree, Jeff, that we shouldn’t rush to conclusions about the absurdity of (parts of) morality, but I am inclined that way as a result of my work on specific paradoxes. So the way to challenge my tentative but general claims would be to resolve or otherwise deal with some of the specific paradoxes I offer (I know that you have tried to do this in your own comments). While in general my philosophical temperament is not averse to theory, here I have definitely gone from the bottom up, and I will not easily give up my growing skepticism about the general coherence and consistency of morality unless specific paradoxes are shown to be other than I have claimed. But in any case I agree that more work is in order.

Which brings us to Thom’s point. I don’t know enough about those areas but you are probably right (perhaps with the limited exception of things related to decision theory). The neglect of moral paradoxes is very odd. It becomes more odd if we reflect on the splendid example that Derek Parfit gave us, particularly in REASONS AND PERSONS. Some of his specific paradoxes have been of course discussed, and there seems to be some continuing work on population paradoxes and the like, but the model he provided was not really followed, in going after moral paradoxes in areas Parfit did not cover. Why is the pursuit of paradox so rare in ethics? I have speculated a bit on this in the introduction to my book. One explanation might be that people working in (say) the theory of knowledge or logic are more sure of themselves and of their field, and are hence not afraid of thinking about what might seem like mere games. Or perhaps morality itself is perceived at some level as such “serious business”, and paradoxes as a social or psychological threat, that we shy away from any hint of paradox. But surely the spirit of playfulness and risk-taking shown by the concern with paradox in other philosophical fields has born fruit.

I have not mentioned all the work on moral paradoxes that I am aware of (Larry Temkin, for example, is doing really interesting stuff on transitivity). And I am sure that there is work on the paradoxical that I don’t know about (I would be grateful for any help here!). Finally, perhaps someone IS working on things that border on the paradoxical, but he or she have not recognized this so far, and maybe this discussion will make them more aware.

Thanks for the great series and focus on moral paradoxes. I have enjoyed following and participating in the topic.

I agree with you that studying and understanding paradoxes can lead to important learning and substantial advancements in our understanding of morality. In fact, I think it’s a great approach to help us challenge some of our assumptions, examine evidence and arguments, consider conclusions, and move understanding forward.

That said, although I’m very convinced, of course, that apparent paradoxes exist, I’m not yet convinced that true, genuine, ‘existential paradoxes’ exist, at least in the realm of morality, of the sort that might suggest that morality itself is, as you put it, “absurd.”

I think that the value of studying and analyzing paradoxes, from the standpoint of advancing our understanding of the underlying subject (in this case, morality), comes substantially by assuming the viewpoint (or approach) that it is far more likely that we (humans, philosophers, scientists, etc.) need to examine and refine our premises, arguments, assumptions, inherited and current paradigms, and so forth than it is likely that reality or morality themselves are “absurd”, unless you mean ‘absurd’ in a slightly different sense than I understand it. For example, is the fact that humans often have to balance conflicting desires and needs “absurd”? Is the fact that most of the poll results on this site (e.g., The Kamm Poll) are not unanimous and, in some cases, are quite mixed, to be considered “absurd”? Is the rather basic fact that we are born into this world, and then die, “absurd”?

I would argue that, by combining the latest scientific understanding of human morality with sound reasoning and with vital philosophical understandings, and by massaging and polishing that mixture—retaining that which makes sense and which coalesces, and refining or discarding that which doesn’t—we can better understand that which appears to be paradoxical, and we can advance our understanding of the subject (in this case, morality) itself. (By saying this, I don’t mean, of course, that we should ignore or discard valid evidence and/or sound reasoning. Quite the opposite.) If, after all that, we are forced to conclude in some way that reality and/or morality are “absurd”, then we will have concluded that genuine “existential paradoxes” do exist, or probably exist, but the process will also give us a much more specific and narrow understanding of what we mean by ‘absurd’ in this specific context. Maybe by understanding, narrowing, and precisely specifying what we find to be “absurd” with respect to a given matter, the sense of absurdity itself will be mitigated or go away entirely.

In any case, the topic is an important one, and I look forward to reading your book.