Professor David Enoch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) gave a talk today at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar on ‘Giving Practical Reasons.’ A copy of David’s talk can be found here and he would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:

I am writing a mediocre paper on a topic you are not particularly interested in. You don’t have, it seems safe to assume, a (normative) reason to read my draft. I then ask whether you would be willing to have a look and tell me what you think. Suddenly you do have a (normative) reason to read my draft. By my asking, I managed to give you the reason to read the draft. What does such reason-giving consist in? And how is it that we can do it?

The Annual H.L.A. Hart Lecture will be given this year by Professor Joseph Raz (Oxford/Columbia).

Title: Responsibility and the Negligence Standard
Date and Time: Tuesday, 26 May 2009, at 5 p.m.
Venue: Blue Boar Lecture Theatre, Christ Church, Oxford

There will also be a post-lecture discussion at 3:45pm in the Goodhart Seminar Room, University College, Oxford, on Wednesday 27 May 2009, and it will end in time for people to attend the final Locke Lecture.

The lecture is open to the public and all are very welcome.

Those who plan to attend the Aims of Belief conference might be interested in knowing about another conference in Oslo earlier that week, on June 8 and 9.

Title: The Atypical Perpetrator
Date: 8. jun. 2009 09:30 – 9. jun. 2009 15:30
Place: Auditorium 14, Domus Biblioteca Legg til i kalender
Theme: This conference is concerned with the relationships between ethics, psychiatry and criminal responsibility.

The full program and registration information can be found here: l

To register, please contact Per Jørgen Ystehede:

The Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo, will host
an international conference on the Aim of Belief on 11-13 June, 2009.

Registration is free and includes lunches and coffee. Spaces are limited. Please register by emailing your name and affiliation to


Time and place: Jun 11, 2009 02:00 PM – Jun 13, 2009 06:00 PM, Auditorium 3, Sophus Bugge, Blindern

Welcome David Enoch!
By S. Matthew Liao

We are very pleased that David Enoch has joined us as a Contributor. David is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. He writes mostly in moral, political, and legal philosophy. He’s now working on a book manuscript tentatively entitled “Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism”. Welcome aboard, David!

On June 3-4, the Law and Philosophy Forum at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem will hold an international conference on extensions of justice. The conference is organized by Prof. David Heyd. Speakers and commentators include Axel Gosseries, Avner De-Shalit, Lukas Meyer, Daniel Statman, Melinda Roberts, David Enoch, Gustaf Arrhenius, Re’em Segev, David Miller, Chaim Gans, Shlomi Segall, Efrat Ram Tiktin, Joshua Cohen, Yitzhak Benbaji, Daniel Attas, and David Heyd.
You can find the conference program, and other details (and soon, we hope, also the papers) on the conference website, here.

Workshop on Self-Defence and National-Defence
Humanities Research Institute
University of Sheffield, 19th June 2009

10.00 – 10.30 – Registration and Coffee
10.30 – 11.45 – Suzanne Uniacke (Hull)
11.45 – 12.15 – Tea and Coffee
12.15 – 13.30 – Helen Frowe (Sheffield)
13.30 – 14.30 – Lunch
14.30 – 15.45 – Gerald Lang (Leeds)
15.45 – 16.15 – Tea and Coffee
16.15 – 17.30 – Gerhard Øverland (CAPPE, Melbourne)

Professor Andrew Reisner from McGill University gave a talk today at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar on ‘Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value.’ A copy of Andrew’s talk can be found here and he would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:

In the decade since the buck passing analysis of good (BPA) was (re)introduced by T.M. Scanlon in his book, What We Owe to Each Other, there has been a great deal of optimism about the view. This optimism is not well founded, and so I shall argue that it is time to abandon the BPA. My suggestion is not that the BPA cannot be made to work for one narrow technical reason or another. Rather, I shall argue that the is unable to deliver on its supposed advantages and that in the end it lacks plausibility as an analysis of final value.

Dr. Krister Bykvist from Oxford University gave a talk entitled ‘Objective verus Subjective Moral Oughts’ this past Monday at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar. A copy of Krister’s talk can be found here and he would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:

It is common in normative ethics to abstract away from any epistemic shortcomings of the agent. In this highly idealized debate, virtue ethics will simply tell you to do what the virtuous person would do (or what would display the most virtuous motive), whereas Kantian ethics will tell you to do what is based on a universalizable maxim, and utilitarianism, what would maximize general happiness. But is it right to ignore the epistemic situation of the agent?

The Vice of Procrastination
By Sergio Tenenbaum

Since it might take a while till I have a version of my contribution to the Moral Philosophy Seminar that is in reasonable shape, I am posting meanwhile a link to a “companion piece” to it. The piece is called “The Vice of Procrastination” and is forthcoming in a volume on procrastination (the contributors tried really hard to refrain from making the obvious jokes) entitled The Thief of Time edited by Chrisoula Andreou and Mark White.

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