Professor David Enoch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) gave a talk today at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar on ‘Giving Practical Reasons .’ A copy of David’s talk can be found here  and he would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:
I am writing a mediocre paper on a topic you are not particularly interested in. You don’t have, it seems safe to assume, a (normative) reason to read my draft. I then ask whether you would be willing to have a look and tell me what you think. Suddenly you do have a (normative) reason to read my draft. By my asking, I managed to give you the reason to read the draft. What does such reason-giving consist in? And how is it that we can do it?
In this paper, I characterize what I call robust reason giving, of the kind present in requests. I distinguish it from epistemic and merely triggering reason-giving, I discuss in detail the phenomenology of robust reason-giving, and I offer an analysis of robust reason-giving in terms of the complex intentions of the reason-giver and of the normative background.