JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY:
An International Journal of Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy

(ISSN 1740-4681)

Volume 6, Number 3 (2009)

ARTICLES

Alex Friedman, ‘Intransitive Ethics’, pp. 277-97

David Lefkowitz, ‘Partiality and Weighing Harm to Non-Combatants’, pp. 298-316

Gerald Lang, ‘Luck Egalitarianism, Permissible Inequalities, and Moral Hazard’, pp. 317-38

Heath White, ‘Fitting Attitudes, Wrong Kinds of Reasons, and Mind-Independent Goodness’, pp. 339-64

Leo Zaibert, ‘The Paradox of Forgiveness’, pp. 365-93

REVIEW ARTICLE

Robert Stern, ‘The Autonomy of Morality and the Morality of Autonomy’, pp. 395-415

Sobel on Parfit on Subjectivism
By S. Matthew Liao

Professor David Sobel (University of Nebraska-Lincoln) gave a talk recently at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar on ‘Parfit on Subjectivism.’ A copy of the paper can be found here, and he would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:

Derek Parfit argues that all subjective accounts of normative reasons make wildly implausible claims. He rightly insists that we have reasons to get sensations that we like and to avoid agony now and in the future. Subjective accounts cannot accommodate this thought, he claims, because likings are importantly different from desires and because subjectivists are forced to give weight only to desires that the agent currently has. One might, even after informed deliberation, fail to desire now that one avoids future agony. So subjectivists cannot vindicate the obvious claim that we now have reason to avoid tomorrow’s agony.

Professor Russ Shafer-Landau has announced the program for the 6th Annual Metaethics Workshop, which will take place in Madison, WI on Sept 11-13, 2009, and which looks fantastic!

All sessions will take place in 313 Pyle Center (702 Langdon Street)

FRIDAY SEPTEMBER 11
9am – 10:15am JON TRESAN (Florida)
Naturalistic Moral Realism, Moral Twin Earth, and the Meta-Moral Use of Moral Words
Chair: Christian Coons (Bowling Green)

10:40am – Noon EARL CONEE (Rochester)
The Best Alternative
Chair: David Merli (Franklin & Marshall)

1:30pm – 2:45pm SARAH McGRATH (Princeton)
Moral Knowledge and Experience
Chair: Luke Robinson (SMU)

Professor Stephen Finlay (University of Southern California) gave a talk recently at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar on ‘Metaethical Contextualism Defended’, which he co-wrote with Gunnar Björnsson. A copy of the paper can be found here and they would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of the talk:

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