“It is sometimes claimed that these sensations are in themselves door or bad in the sense that their intrinsic qualitative features give us reason to like or dislike them. But we do not, I believe, have such reasons. Whether we like, dislike, or are indifferent to these various sensations we are not responding or failing to respond to any reasons.”

“When we are in pain what is bad is not our sensation but our conscious state of having a sensation that we dislike. If we did not dislike the sensation, our conscious state would not be bad.”

Parfit is not, as I point out in my paper, what I call a Benthamite Hedonist who maintains that some sensations provide reasons independently of our favorable or unfavorable attitudes towards those sensations. Rather, as I say in my paper, Parfit’s attempt to deny that desires provide reasons hinges on accounting for such reasons of mere taste by making use of likings rather than desires and then explaining the difference between the two states. In my paper I discuss this case Parfit makes for this difference and explain why I think the difference Parfit points to between likings and desires is unconvincing. But, more importantly, I also go on to wonder why likings should not be thought to be the sort of state that subjectivists have had in mind all along since they are contingent individualized pro or con attitudes that we have no reason to have.

Thanks very much for the comments which I hope to find time to study soon. I am afraid attempts to e-mail you back directly bounced back to me.

Best,
David

Some objections:
Sobel’s response depends on the availability of his Reasons Transfer Principle for subjectivists.

RTP: “If one will later have a reason to get 0, then one now has a reason to facilitate the later getting of 0.”

The principle seems kind of an ad hoc patch to save subjectivism against the Agony argument. Unless it is derivative of a further more general principle available to the subjectivist. And though it isn’t laid out explicitly in the paper, it seems that Sobel regards it as derived from the more general

“Maximal lifetime desire satisfaction principle”

whereby subjectivists can appeal to a constraint on rationality such that any rational agent “should act so as to maximally comply with one’s subjectively determined reasons over one’s life” or “achieve lives that involve getting as much of what we really want over time as possible”.

So the RTP seems just to be a special instance where future reasons providing present reasons, because of the general principle that any reason had at T to facilitate that (F at T*) provides reason at any other Tn to facilitate that (F at T*), insofar as such facilitation is possible at Tn. I.e. reasons had at any time provide reasons at any other time – whether future reasons providing present reasons, present reasons providing future reasons, past reasons providing present reasons, etc.

Neither of these principles seem plausible and so aren’t available to a subjectivist as general constraints on practical rationality.

Do future desire-based reasons provide present reason to facilitate the fulfillment of those future desires? If I, per hypothesis, presently see no value in the object of my future desire, I don’t see why someone should rationally at present seek to facilitate the fulfillment of that future desire. The usual Ulysses and Siren type examples (that Sobel explicitly lays aside) are the most flagrant counter-examples to RTP. But let me try another (more awkward) one that avoids the implication of present-future conflict of values: I now desire to lose weight and to this end take a pill that will make me want to win the London marathon (an goal intentionally unlikely to be achieved), and so make me train intensely. I am at present also given the one-off possibility of taking a wonder-drug giving me temporarily the super-endurance necessary to win one such marathon. Do I have reason to take the drug? It would facilitate the fulfillment of my future desire, but it is absurd to say I should rationally take it.

More generally, RTP ends up taking subjectivism from ‘too few reasons’ to ‘too many reasons’: The Agony argument shows that some future desires provide present reasons, but clearly not all. Even with the supplementary constraint of ‘real’ (i.e. ideal deliberator) desires, there are still too many. For a subjectivist endorsing desire-based reasons AND the RTP constraint will create implausible present reasons derived from future arbitrary desires that I do not presently have. If during my future mid-life crisis I shall (‘really’) want a Porsche, that creates no present imperative to facilitate that future endeavor, if, say, I now find that future desire merely frivolous and not contributive to my future well-being.

Maybe some of the apparent plausibility of RTP comes from the tacit sense that being in a state of desire as such involves suffering. And so facilitating future ambitions in the present may seem like something I should be concerned to do. That is clearly the case for some desires – such as the agony case – but clearly does not apply to all desires. Some desires are both frivolous and not unpleasant – so not being concerned to fulfill them before I have them is perfectly rational. And yet, once I do have them, they provide reasons to satisfy them (given they survive ideal deliberation).

As for the underlying principle of lifetime maximal desire satisfaction, it also seems an implausible constraint. I can quite rationally want a life where many (most?) of my desires are thwarted under the agis of a philosophy of ‘the journey/struggle is more important than the destination/victory’ or simply put little store in the aim of maximal desire satisfaction. I can want, for each of my desires, that it be satisfied, and yet not want all of my desires satisfied. (what Kenny once called Omega inconsistency).

Anyway, I’m running on, so better stop.