The Social Epistemology Research Group (SERG) at the University of Copenhagen is hosting a one-day epistemology workshop. The workshop is part of a series of workshops and conferences to be held in connection with the research project “The Epistemology of Liberal Democracy: Truth, Free Speech, and Disagreement,” funded by the Velux Foundation.

The details are as follows.

September 17, 2009
University of Copenhagen, Denmark

The British Academy, in association with the Centre de recherche en éthique de l’Université de Montréal, will be hosting an international conference on the work of Onora O’Neill, entitled “Ethics and Politics Beyond Borders: The Work of Onora O’Neill.

24-26 SEPTEMBER 2009
10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1
Convenor: Professor David Archard (Lancaster University)

Thursday, 24 September 2009
12.00 Registration

1.30 Session 1: The ethics and politics of global justice
Welcome and opening remarks

Boston University is holding a conference on Ronald Dworkin’s forthcoming book Justice for Hedgehogs from September 25 to 26. We have an excellent lineup that includes Michael Smith, Russ Shafer-Landau, Francis Kamm, David Lyons, Robert Kane, T.M. Scanlon, Armatya Sen, Aaron Garrett, Susanne Sreedhar, Candice Delmas, Samuel Freeman, Jeremy Waldron, and Ronald Dworkin himself. The complete list of speakers is below.


“The fox knows many things
but the hedgehog knows one big thing.”

September 25-26, 2009
Boston University

Readers might be interested in the Experimental Philosophy Page, which has over 100 papers covering causation, consciousness, folk psychology, intentional action, metaphilosophy and other areas of research, and which looks to be a very helpful resource. All entries have citations and links, and many also have excerpts or abstracts and links to the authors’ academic web page.

The site is set up such that anyone can edit and update the page, e.g., by adding a paper that isn’t yet included. In fact, the site will only continue to be useful if a decent number of people chip in and add to/update it. So if you have done research in this area, do chime in.

August 14, 2009
University of Copenhagen, Denmark

09.00 – 09.15: Coffee and tea
09.15 – 10.00: Berit Brogaard: Reasonable Disagreement and Entitlements to Trust
10.15 – 11.00: Richard Feldman: Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreements.
11.15 – 12.00: Jesper Kallestrup: Bootstrap and Rollback: Epistemic Circularity Generalized.
12.00 – 13.15: Lunch
13.15 – 14.00: Mikkel Gerken: Warrant by Testimony in Contexts of Disagreement and Diversity
14.15 – 15.00: Klemens Kappel and Nikolaj Jang Pedersen: When Can the Non-Conformist Learn from Disagreeing Experts?
15.15 – 16.00: Kristoffer Ahlström: Agency and Amelioration

Fordham University is holding a workshop on Epistemic Normativity on April 16th and 17th, 2010.

Fordham University
Lincoln Center Campus
April 16th and 17th, 2010

Jeremy Fantl (Calgary) & Matt McGrath (Missouri)
Richard Foley (NYU)
John Greco (St. Louis)
Thomas Kelly (Princeton)
Michael Lynch (Connecticut)
Linda Martin-Alcoff (CUNY)
Wayne Riggs (Oklahoma)
Dennis Whitcomb (Western Washington)

Welcome Melinda Roberts!
By S. Matthew Liao

A very warm welcome to Professor Melinda Roberts, who joins us as a Contributor. Melinda is a professor of philosophy at the College of New Jersey. Her main research areas include obligations in respect of future persons, the nonidentity problem, procreative ethics, law and ethics and consequentialism. She is also interested in expected value and such issues as the two-envelope problem. Melinda is currently completing a manuscript called Abortion and the Moral Significance of Merely Possible Persons: Finding Middle Ground in “Hard Cases.” Welcome aboard, Melinda!

Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem, edited by Melinda Roberts and David Wasserman, just came out!

From the back cover:
This collection of essays investigates the obligations we have in respect of future persons, ranging from our own future offspring to distant future generations. What are our obligations to persons who have not yet, but eventually will, come into existence? Can we harm them? Can we wrong them? Can the fact that our choice means that a worse off person will exist in place of a better off but “nonidentical” person make that choice is wrong?

This work is licensed under a Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0.