The first St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR) will take place May 23-25, 2010 at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. The conference is designed to provide a forum for new work on practical and theoretical reason, broadly construed. Please submit an abstract of 500-1000 words by December 31, 2009 to SLACRR (at) gmail.com. (In writing your abstract, please bear in mind that full papers should suitable for a 30 minute presentation.) We are also interested in finding commentators for papers, so please let us know if you would have an interest
in commenting.

Date: October 29, 2009
Venue: Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen (Amager), Room 14.2.50

Schedule:
10.30-12.00: Adam Carter (Edinburgh/Geneva):
Knowledge, Testimony and Philosophical Expertise

13.15-14.45 S. Matthew Liao (Oxford):
Disagreeing with Peers

15.00-16.30: Peter Graham (UC Riverside):
Reliability and Entitlement

16.45-18.15: Mikkel Gerken (SERG, Copenhagen):
Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions

There is no registration fee. However, if you would like to attend the workshop—or have any enquiries concerning the event—please contact Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (nikolaj (at) ucla.edu).

In this post, all too long and speculative, I will examine how a sentimentalist theory of moral thinking could exploit and improve recently popular theories of universal moral grammar, developed by John Mikhail, Susan Dwyer, Marc Hauser’s group, Gilbert Harman and Erica Roedder, and others. I’ll be drawing mostly on Mikhail’s 2009 ‘Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence’, in Psychology of Learning and Motivation 50, 27–100 for moral grammar. The sentimentalist theory I sketch is my own, though heavily inspired by Adam Smith. It is independently motivated, but I believe it does a better job of explaining our intuitions than other views that highlight the role of emotions.

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