Professor Torbjörn Tännsjö (Stockholm University) will be giving a talk next Monday at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar  entitled ‘In Defence of Moral Realism .’ A copy of Torbjörn’s talk can be found here  and he would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:
I will present some ideas from a forthcoming book, “From Reasons to Norms: On the Basic Question in Ethics  (Springer, forthcoming). I will argue that there is a unique and objective answer to the question what we ought to do, simpliciter. I will rebut Mackie’s arguments from queerness and relativity, and Harman’s empiricist argument in defence of moral nihilism, and following Ewing, Nagel, and Dworkin, I will argue that we are allowed to turn the content of our moral beliefs against the nihilist thesis.