University of Gothenburg, Sweden
August 17-18th 2011
The relation between moral judgments and moral motivation is a central issue in ethical theory, having implications for the nature of moral judgments, the meaning of normative terms, and the possibility of objective truth and knowledge in morality. According to a strong form of motivational internalism, the relation is both intrinsic and necessary: to judge that an act is morally wrong is (at least in part) to be motivated not to perform it. When combined with a humean theory of motivation, this form of internalism has often been seen as incompatible with moral cognitivism or objectivism.
The relevance of recently developed weaker forms of internalism is less clear, however. The aim of this workshop is to address this issue, bringing together philosophers who have defended or criticised such forms of internalism and philosophers who work on questions related to the relevance of internalism. Plenty of time will be left for both formal and informal discussion.
* Jon Tresan (Chapel Hill)
* Nick Zangwill (Durham)
* Michael Ridge (Edinburgh)
* James Lenman (Sheffield)
* Gunnar Bj÷rnsson (Link÷ping, Gothenburg)
* Caj Strandberg (Gothenburg)
* John Eriksson (Gothenburg)
* Ragnar FrancÚn (Stockholm)
Further information about schedule and venue will be posted on http://www.phil.gu.se/mmer/MMER/workshop2.html .
Participation is free, but participants need to register by email to gunnar.bjornsson (at) gu.se before August 10th.