In “Putting the Trolley in Order: Experimental Philosophy and the Loop Case”  (forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology),  Alex Wiegmann, Joshua Alexander and Gerard Vong and I applied the methods of experimental philosophy to Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous Loop Case. As the readers will know, Thomson used the Loop Case to cast doubt on the intuitively plausible Doctrine of Double Effect. Many philosophers share Thomson’s intuitions about this case (see, e.g. Kamm 2007  and Scanlon 2008 ), though not all (see, e.g. Otsuka 2008  and my paper in 2009 ). In fact, Frances Kamm developed the Doctrine of Triple Effect (DTE) in order to explain Loop intuitions.
In our study, we found that intuitions about the Loop Case vary according to the context in which the case is considered. We argue that this undermines the supposed evidential status of intuitions about the Loop Case.
A pre-publication version of the paper can be found here . We would very much welcome any comments/suggestions.