Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Guest editors: Mark Phelan & Adam Waytz
Deadline for submissions: 31 March 2012

When people regard other entities as objects of ethical concern whose interests must be taken into account in moral deliberations, does the attribution of consciousness to these entities play an essential role in the process? In recent years, philosophers and psychologists have begun to sketch limited answers to this general question. However, much progress remains to be made. Contributions to a special issue of The Review of Philosophy and Psychology on the role of consciousness attribution in moral cognition from researchers working in fields including developmental, evolutionary, perceptual, and social psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy are invited.

10-11 September 2012
Universidad de Navarra
Pamplona, Spain

This conference addresses the question of whether human action is intrinsically moral, and hence as well the question of whether and how a conception of the nature of action ought to be relevant for a theory of what is good or right to do. This issue comes up in contemporary discussions in many different forms: whether practical rationality can be understood in instrumental terms, whether instrumental rationality is normative, whether all intentional action is done under “the guise of the good,” etc. The aim of the conference is to address this question from a variety of perspectives, both historical (Aristotelian, Humean, Kantian and Hegelian approaches) and contemporary (Davidson, Anscombe, etc.). Also of interest for our subject are perspectives on action in the social sciences, which standardly approach action is instrumental (“rational choice”) and yet also theorize the social dimensions of human agency, like Hegel or even Aristotle. The conference aims to make a contribution to the study of human action, overcoming the abstractions and shortcomings that stem from a lack of dialogue between different traditions and academic disciplines.

Cleveland State University
Cleveland, Ohio
Saturday, March 31, 2012

Keynote Speaker
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
Morehead Alumni Distinguished Professor
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Papers are invited on any topic. Papers should be less than 4000 words (not including notes) and be deliverable in half an hour or less. Submissions should be prepared for blind review and include an abstract of no more than 200 words. An electronic copy (.DOC, .DOCX, .RTF, .PDF, or .TXT only, please) should be sent to arrive no later than January 15, 2012, to:

program (at) ohiophilosophy.org

Gothenburg, Sweden
May 18-20, 2012
Abstracts Submission Deadline: January 20, 2012

James Dreier, Brown University
Can Reasons Fundamentalism Answer the Normative Question?

Jeanette Kennett, Macquarie University
Moral Motivation and Its Impairments: Empirical and Philosophical Approaches

Jesse Prinz, CUNY
An Empirical Case for Emotionally Based Internalism

Michael Ridge, University of Edinburgh
Internalism: Cui Bono?

Michael Smith, Princeton University
Moral Judgements, Judgements about Reasons, and Motivations

Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Ohio State University
Detecting Value with Motivational Responses

Jon Tresan, UNC Chapel Hill
Objective Moral Realism & The Role-Individuation of Moral Judgments

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