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	<title>Ethics Etc &#187; Antti Kauppinen&#8217;s Posts</title>
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		<title>The Truth in Cultural Relativism</title>
		<link>http://ethics-etc.com/2010/04/25/the-truth-in-cultural-relativism/</link>
		<comments>http://ethics-etc.com/2010/04/25/the-truth-in-cultural-relativism/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 25 Apr 2010 19:12:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Antti Kauppinen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Antti Kauppinen's Posts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experimental Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experimental Philosophy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Metaethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Moral Psychology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Normative Ethics]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ethics-etc.com/?p=502</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Do moral judgments form a psychological natural kind? Lately, Stephen Stich and his colleagues have been arguing on the basis of empirical evidence that the features psychologists have identified as key to moral judgment do not, as a matter of fact, cluster together in a lawlike fashion. In particular, they argue that harm attributions do [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>3</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Leeds Value Concepts Workshop, March 5-6</title>
		<link>http://ethics-etc.com/2010/02/01/leeds-value-concepts-workshop-march-5-6/</link>
		<comments>http://ethics-etc.com/2010/02/01/leeds-value-concepts-workshop-march-5-6/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Feb 2010 11:29:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Antti Kauppinen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Antti Kauppinen's Posts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Metaethics]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ethics-etc.com/?p=319</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Value Concepts Workshop University of Leeds March 5-6, 2010 Matti Eklund (Cornell) “Misevaluation, Moral Semantics, and Moral Realism” Janice Dowell (Nebraska) “A Flexible, Contextualist Account of ‘Ought’” Antti Kauppinen (Amsterdam) “A Defence of Moral Invariantism” Simon Kirchin (Kent) “Determinables, Determinates, and Thick Concepts” Daniel Elstein (Leeds) “Why There Can Be No Good Reason to Accept [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://ethics-etc.com/2010/02/01/leeds-value-concepts-workshop-march-5-6/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Sentimentalism and Moral Grammar</title>
		<link>http://ethics-etc.com/2009/10/05/sentimentalism-and-moral-grammar/</link>
		<comments>http://ethics-etc.com/2009/10/05/sentimentalism-and-moral-grammar/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2009 12:45:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Antti Kauppinen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Antti Kauppinen's Posts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experimental Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Moral Psychology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Normative Ethics]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ethics-etc.com/2009/10/05/sentimentalism-and-moral-grammar/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In this post, all too long and speculative, I will examine how a sentimentalist theory of moral thinking could exploit and improve recently popular theories of universal moral grammar, developed by John Mikhail, Susan Dwyer, Marc Hauser’s group, Gilbert Harman and Erica Roedder, and others. I’ll be drawing mostly on Mikhail’s 2009 ‘Moral Grammar and [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://ethics-etc.com/2009/10/05/sentimentalism-and-moral-grammar/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>6</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Surveying Loose Talk</title>
		<link>http://ethics-etc.com/2009/09/19/surveying-loose-talk/</link>
		<comments>http://ethics-etc.com/2009/09/19/surveying-loose-talk/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 19 Sep 2009 19:59:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Antti Kauppinen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Antti Kauppinen's Posts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experimental Philosophy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophical Methods]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophy of Mind]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ethics-etc.com/2009/09/19/surveying-loose-talk/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This is the first in a series of posts about recent work in experimental philosophy. I will be examining some persistent general issues with the different experimental approaches by way of looking at particular papers in some detail. I&#8217;ll begin with &#8216;Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience&#8217; by Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery. The problem that [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://ethics-etc.com/2009/09/19/surveying-loose-talk/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>5</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Thinking About Reasons</title>
		<link>http://ethics-etc.com/2009/09/15/thinking-about-reasons/</link>
		<comments>http://ethics-etc.com/2009/09/15/thinking-about-reasons/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2009 23:36:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Antti Kauppinen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Antti Kauppinen's Posts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Metaethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Moral Psychology]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ethics-etc.com/2009/09/15/thinking-about-reasons/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Expressivist accounts of normative judgment typically (always?) begin with all-things-considered verdicts: Hurrah (helping old ladies cross the road)! Boo (getting your little brother to murder)! But of course, many normative thoughts are not all-things-considered. I think there is some reason for me to go to bed early, and some reason for me not to do [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>12</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Sweating Hard and Hanging Out: The Case for Diachronic Perfectionism</title>
		<link>http://ethics-etc.com/2009/02/08/sweating-hard-and-hanging-out-the-case-for-diachronic-perfectionism/</link>
		<comments>http://ethics-etc.com/2009/02/08/sweating-hard-and-hanging-out-the-case-for-diachronic-perfectionism/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 08 Feb 2009 12:51:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Antti Kauppinen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Antti Kauppinen's Posts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Normative Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Value Theory]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ethics-etc.com/2009/02/08/sweating-hard-and-hanging-out-the-case-for-diachronic-perfectionism/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Let us loosely define perfectionism as the view that well-being consists in the (enjoyable) exercise of the capacities that are distinctive of one&#8217;s biological species. A dog does well when it does the sort of things that exemplify dogness, and we people do best when we make use of our various human capacities &#8211; rational, [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://ethics-etc.com/2009/02/08/sweating-hard-and-hanging-out-the-case-for-diachronic-perfectionism/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>19</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>On Human Shields and Excuses</title>
		<link>http://ethics-etc.com/2009/01/19/on-human-shields-and-excuses/</link>
		<comments>http://ethics-etc.com/2009/01/19/on-human-shields-and-excuses/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Jan 2009 19:54:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Antti Kauppinen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Antti Kauppinen's Posts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Normative Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Political Philosophy]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ethics-etc.com/2009/01/19/on-human-shields-and-excuses/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The recent war in Gaza has stimulated a lot of popular discussion about the moral implications of the use of so-called ‘human shields’, non-combatants who are in close proximity to combatants, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Much of this discussion has been very simplistic and transparently rhetorical. Nevertheless, there are interesting ethical issues arising in the [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://ethics-etc.com/2009/01/19/on-human-shields-and-excuses/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>9</slash:comments>
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