Readers may know that I’ve recently taken up an associate professorship in the Center for Bioethics with an affiliation in the philosophy department at NYU. The Center runs a Master’s Program in Bioethics and is holding an open house on

Thursday, March 4, 2010
5:30-7:30 PM
285 Mercer Street, 9th Floor
(Between Waverly and Washington Pl.)
New York, NY 10003

If you are interested in pursuing graduate studies in Bioethics, this will be a good opportunity to meet with the faculty and students and discuss the range of Program options and career benefits. Food and refreshments will be served.

AHRC workshop on “The Future of Consent”
Date: March 22nd-24th 2010
Location: Chancellor’s Conference Centre, Manchester

There are a limited number of places available for a two day interdisciplinary and international workshop—The Future of Consent—organised by Neil Manson and Dave Archard (Lancaster) and funded by the AHRC with additional support from the Society for Applied Philosophy.

Continuum Ethics
A series of books exploring key topics in contemporary ethics and moral philosophy.

Continuum Ethics presents a series of books that will bridge the gap between new research work and undergraduate textbooks. They will provide close examination of key concepts in contemporary moral philosophy. Aimed largely at upper-level undergraduates and research students, they will also appeal to researchers in the field. Authors will be expected to combine philosophical sophistication with an accessible style that can engage the educated reader.

The British Academy, in association with the Centre de recherche en éthique de l’Université de Montréal, will be hosting an international conference on the work of Onora O’Neill, entitled “Ethics and Politics Beyond Borders: The Work of Onora O’Neill.

24-26 SEPTEMBER 2009
10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1
Convenor: Professor David Archard (Lancaster University)

Thursday, 24 September 2009
12.00 Registration

1.30 Session 1: The ethics and politics of global justice
Welcome and opening remarks

The 2nd annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (RoME) will be held in Boulder, Colorado August 6-9 2009. Note that this is a congress, not just a conference. That means it’s more important. There may even be a sexual connotation to “congress” for those whose minds work like that. Who am I to judge?

Some have called the first RoME Congress (August 2008) “the best damn ethics conference or congress ever. Perhaps even the best damn philosophy conference or congress ever”. I am supremely confident that the 2nd RoME Congress will be even better.

Reductio Ad Hermaphroditum
By Dominic Wilkinson

At the James Martin Seminar in Oxford this week, Melbourne philosopher Rob Sparrow presented an argument against enhancement and procreative beneficence. His work had raised some interest in the popular media when he presented it a few months ago, and I posted a short potential response to his argument at Practical Ethics News.

In this post, and (if I can find time) subsequent posts I would like to explore the implications and possible responses to Rob’s intriguing reductio argument. First, an outline of the argument. Rob’s presentation was based upon a series of cases. I will reproduce them as faithfully as I can (from memory).

The Stony Brook University Department of Philosophy is hosting a conference on “Cognitive Disability: A Challenge to Moral Philosophy.” The conference features a fantastic group of speakers and panelists. Those who are interested in this topic should definitely consider attending.

A Special Issue on the Ethics of Enhancement guest-edited by me and two other Contributors of Ethics Etc, Julian Savulescu and David Wasserman, has just come out with the Journal of Applied Philosophy. Here are the links to the papers if you have institutional access:

The Ethics of Enhancement: Guest Editors’ Introduction
S. MATTHEW LIAO, JULIAN SAVULESCU, DAVID WASSERMAN

The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity
INGMAR PERSSON, JULIAN SAVULESCU

Issues in the Pharmacological Induction of Emotions
DAVID WASSERMAN, S. MATTHEW LIAO

Why not hybrid embryos?
By Thom Brooks

Recently, British MP’s voted to allow the creation of hybrid embryos for medical research. These embryos would be 99.9% “human” but 0.1% “cow” or “rabbit” — the animal element is simply the use of animal eggs, from which animal DNA is extracted, human DNA implanted, the “hybrid” embryo is then given an electric shock, and then stem cells harvested for use in research. All matter must be destroyed within 14 days. (Q&A on hybrid embryos can be found here.)

This move has been highly controversial for several reasons. Some of these reasons include the following:

New Blog: Practical Ethics
By S. Matthew Liao

Readers of Ethics Etc might be interested in a new blog called Practical Ethics, which “provides a daily ethical analysis of the latest developments in science, technology and other current affairs.”

The authors are drawn from researchers at three research centres at the University of Oxford, the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, the Program on the Ethics of the New Biosciences, and the Future of Humanity Institute.

What is unique about this blog is that the ideas expressed in the posts are intended to be one possible angle regarding ethical issues arising out of the new sciences, and DOES NOT necessarily reflect the opinion of the authors. Do check it out :)

This chapter on moral status is very short, and also mercifully short on intricate imaginary examples. Kamm quickly takes us through a number of relatively familiar normative distinctions and I will try to be brief in recounting them here.

In the broadest sense, moral status simply refers to, roughly, an entity’s moral properties:

Moral status in the broad sense X’s moral status = what is morally permissible/impermissible to do to X

Now in this broad sense, rocks also have moral status: we’re permitted to do to them whatever we like. In common use, moral status refers to something narrower. Kamm thus turns to:

The concept of human nature is an interesting one. This is partly because, although it’s a familiar concept, and one of which most people have at least a prima facie grasp; there are problems with arriving at a satisfactory, robust definition of it that will support normative philosophical claims. (For an account of some problems associated with defining human nature, see David Hull (1986) ‘On Human Nature‘, PSA 2: 3-13). In trying to understand it and work out how to tackle such problems, it’s interesting to look at similar concepts. One that I keep coming back to is the concept ‘physical’.