New Blog: Practical Ethics
By S. Matthew Liao

Readers of Ethics Etc might be interested in a new blog called Practical Ethics, which “provides a daily ethical analysis of the latest developments in science, technology and other current affairs.”

The authors are drawn from researchers at three research centres at the University of Oxford, the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, the Program on the Ethics of the New Biosciences, and the Future of Humanity Institute.

What is unique about this blog is that the ideas expressed in the posts are intended to be one possible angle regarding ethical issues arising out of the new sciences, and DOES NOT necessarily reflect the opinion of the authors. Do check it out :)

This chapter on moral status is very short, and also mercifully short on intricate imaginary examples. Kamm quickly takes us through a number of relatively familiar normative distinctions and I will try to be brief in recounting them here.

In the broadest sense, moral status simply refers to, roughly, an entity’s moral properties:

Moral status in the broad sense X’s moral status = what is morally permissible/impermissible to do to X

Now in this broad sense, rocks also have moral status: we’re permitted to do to them whatever we like. In common use, moral status refers to something narrower. Kamm thus turns to:

The concept of human nature is an interesting one. This is partly because, although it’s a familiar concept, and one of which most people have at least a prima facie grasp; there are problems with arriving at a satisfactory, robust definition of it that will support normative philosophical claims. (For an account of some problems associated with defining human nature, see David Hull (1986) ‘On Human Nature‘, PSA 2: 3-13). In trying to understand it and work out how to tackle such problems, it’s interesting to look at similar concepts. One that I keep coming back to is the concept ‘physical’.