October 12, 2009
CFP: St. Louis Conference on Reasons and Rationality
By S. Matthew Liao
The first St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR) will take place May 23-25, 2010 at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. The conference is designed to provide a forum for new work on practical and theoretical reason, broadly construed. Please submit an abstract of 500-1000 words by December 31, 2009 to SLACRR (at) gmail.com. (In writing your abstract, please bear in mind that full papers should suitable for a 30 minute presentation.) We are also interested in finding commentators for papers, so please let us know if you would have an interest
in commenting.
October 10, 2009
Copenhagen Epistemology Workshop
By S. Matthew Liao
Date: October 29, 2009
Venue: Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen (Amager), Room 14.2.50
Schedule:
10.30-12.00: Adam Carter (Edinburgh/Geneva):
Knowledge, Testimony and Philosophical Expertise
13.15-14.45 S. Matthew Liao (Oxford):
Disagreeing with Peers
15.00-16.30: Peter Graham (UC Riverside):
Reliability and Entitlement
16.45-18.15: Mikkel Gerken (SERG, Copenhagen):
Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions
There is no registration fee. However, if you would like to attend the workshop—or have any enquiries concerning the event—please contact Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (nikolaj (at) ucla.edu).
August 28, 2009
Social Epistemology Workshop at Copenhagen
By S. Matthew Liao
The Social Epistemology Research Group (SERG) at the University of Copenhagen is hosting a one-day epistemology workshop. The workshop is part of a series of workshops and conferences to be held in connection with the research project “The Epistemology of Liberal Democracy: Truth, Free Speech, and Disagreement,” funded by the Velux Foundation.
The details are as follows.
September 17, 2009
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
August 5, 2009
Workshop on Disagreement at Copenhagen
By S. Matthew Liao
WORKSHOP ON DISAGREEMENT
August 14, 2009
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
CONFERENCE PROGRAM:
09.00 – 09.15: Coffee and tea
09.15 – 10.00: Berit Brogaard: Reasonable Disagreement and Entitlements to Trust
10.15 – 11.00: Richard Feldman: Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreements.
11.15 – 12.00: Jesper Kallestrup: Bootstrap and Rollback: Epistemic Circularity Generalized.
12.00 – 13.15: Lunch
13.15 – 14.00: Mikkel Gerken: Warrant by Testimony in Contexts of Disagreement and Diversity
14.15 – 15.00: Klemens Kappel and Nikolaj Jang Pedersen: When Can the Non-Conformist Learn from Disagreeing Experts?
15.15 – 16.00: Kristoffer Ahlström: Agency and Amelioration
August 4, 2009
Epistemic Normativity Workshop at Fordham
By S. Matthew Liao
Fordham University is holding a workshop on Epistemic Normativity on April 16th and 17th, 2010.
Fordham University
Lincoln Center Campus
April 16th and 17th, 2010
Speakers:
Jeremy Fantl (Calgary) & Matt McGrath (Missouri)
Richard Foley (NYU)
John Greco (St. Louis)
Thomas Kelly (Princeton)
Michael Lynch (Connecticut)
Linda Martin-Alcoff (CUNY)
Wayne Riggs (Oklahoma)
Dennis Whitcomb (Western Washington)
May 15, 2009
Oslo Conference on the Aim of Belief
By S. Matthew Liao
The Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo, will host
an international conference on the Aim of Belief on 11-13 June, 2009.
Registration is free and includes lunches and coffee. Spaces are limited. Please register by emailing your name and affiliation to t.h.w.chan@ifikk.uio.no
** by WEDNESDAY 20TH MAY**
Time and place: Jun 11, 2009 02:00 PM – Jun 13, 2009 06:00 PM, Auditorium 3, Sophus Bugge, Blindern
February 2, 2009
Epistemic ethics
By Nick Shackel
What is good and bad? What is virtue and vice? How should we live? These are the big questions of ethics. They are also deeply practical questions. The point is not simply to know the answers but to do what is right and to avoid what is wrong. Through action we pursue ends, manifest character and live life. Action is the nexus of ethical concern. Agents are the authors of action and are also the objects of ethical evaluation. The ethical standing of an agent bears a complex relation to their actions, to how they were sensitive to the ethically relevant facts in coming to their actions and to their general inclinations to act. But agency and action also require believers and belief. What is the ethical status of believers and belief, as such? And what relation do these evaluations surrounding action and belief have to one another?






















































