August 14, 2009
University of Copenhagen, Denmark

09.00 – 09.15: Coffee and tea
09.15 – 10.00: Berit Brogaard: Reasonable Disagreement and Entitlements to Trust
10.15 – 11.00: Richard Feldman: Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreements.
11.15 – 12.00: Jesper Kallestrup: Bootstrap and Rollback: Epistemic Circularity Generalized.
12.00 – 13.15: Lunch
13.15 – 14.00: Mikkel Gerken: Warrant by Testimony in Contexts of Disagreement and Diversity
14.15 – 15.00: Klemens Kappel and Nikolaj Jang Pedersen: When Can the Non-Conformist Learn from Disagreeing Experts?
15.15 – 16.00: Kristoffer Ahlström: Agency and Amelioration

Fordham University is holding a workshop on Epistemic Normativity on April 16th and 17th, 2010.

Fordham University
Lincoln Center Campus
April 16th and 17th, 2010

Jeremy Fantl (Calgary) & Matt McGrath (Missouri)
Richard Foley (NYU)
John Greco (St. Louis)
Thomas Kelly (Princeton)
Michael Lynch (Connecticut)
Linda Martin-Alcoff (CUNY)
Wayne Riggs (Oklahoma)
Dennis Whitcomb (Western Washington)

The Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo, will host
an international conference on the Aim of Belief on 11-13 June, 2009.

Registration is free and includes lunches and coffee. Spaces are limited. Please register by emailing your name and affiliation to


Time and place: Jun 11, 2009 02:00 PM – Jun 13, 2009 06:00 PM, Auditorium 3, Sophus Bugge, Blindern

Epistemic ethics
By Nick Shackel

What is good and bad? What is virtue and vice? How should we live? These are the big questions of ethics. They are also deeply practical questions. The point is not simply to know the answers but to do what is right and to avoid what is wrong. Through action we pursue ends, manifest character and live life. Action is the nexus of ethical concern. Agents are the authors of action and are also the objects of ethical evaluation. The ethical standing of an agent bears a complex relation to their actions, to how they were sensitive to the ethically relevant facts in coming to their actions and to their general inclinations to act. But agency and action also require believers and belief. What is the ethical status of believers and belief, as such? And what relation do these evaluations surrounding action and belief have to one another?

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