Readings
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From Normativity to Responsibility
Joseph Raz
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Ethics and Moral Philosophy
Thom Brooks
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Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover
N. Ann Davis, Richard Keshen and Jeff McMahan
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Reflective Knowledge
Ernest Sosa
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Know How
Jason Stanley
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New Waves in Ethics
Thom Brooks
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Ethics for Enemies: Terror, Torture, and War
F. M. Kamm
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On What Matters
Derek Parfit
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Semantic Relationism
Kit Fine
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All the Power in the World
Peter Unger
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Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory
Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni
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Beyond Humanity?
Allen E. Buchanan
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Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality
Patricia S. Churchland
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Equality and Tradition
Samuel Scheffler
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Climate Ethics
Stephen Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson and Henry Shue
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The Character of Consciousness
David J. Chalmers
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Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament
Thomas Nagel
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Well-Being and Death
Ben Bradley
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The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge from Egoisim
Alison Hills
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Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation
Michael Strevens
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The Case for Contextualism
Keith DeRose
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When Truth Gives Out
Mark Richard
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The Idea of Human Rights
Charles R. Beitz
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Willing, Wanting, Waiting
Richard Holton
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The Idea of Justice
Amartya Sen
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Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem
Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman
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What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being
Richard Kraut
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Content and Justification
Paul A. Boghossian
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Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality
Stephen Yablo
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Normativity
Judith Jarvis Thomson
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How We Get Along
J. David Velleman
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Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity
Christine M. Korsgaard
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Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason
Sergio Tenenbaum
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Killing in War
Jeff McMahan
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Experimental Philosophy
Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols
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Disadvantage
Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit
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Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics
Allan Gibbard
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Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame
T. M. Scanlon
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The Philosophy of Philosophy
Timothy Williamson
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Morality without Foundations
Mark Timmons
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Authority and Estrangement
Richard Moran
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Moral Psychology, Volume 1
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
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The Reflective Life
Valerie Tiberius
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Moral Literacy
Barbara Herman
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On Human Rights
James Griffin
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Experiments in Ethics
Kwame Anthony Appiah
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Reasons without Rationalism
Kieran Setiya
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Moral Realism: A Defence
Russ Shafer-Landau
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The Way We Eat
Peter Singer and Jim Mason
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Metaphysical Essays
John Hawthorne
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10 Moral Paradoxes
Saul Smilansky
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Normativity and the Will
R. Jay Wallace
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Ideal Code, Real World
Brad Hooker
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The Nature of Normativity
Ralph Wedgwood
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Structures of Agency: Essays
Michael E. Bratman
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The Second-Person Standpoint
Stephen Darwall
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Ethics and the A Priori
Michael Smith
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Weighing Lives
John Broome
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Reasons and the Good
Roger Crisp
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September 21, 2011
CFA: SLACRR 3
By S. Matthew Liao
May 20 – 22, 2012
Moonrise Hotel in St Louis, MO
Keynote Speaker:
Jonathan Dancy (Reading/Texas)
St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR) provides a forum for new work on practical and theoretical reason, broadly construed.
Please submit an abstract of 750-1500 words by December 31, 2011 to SLACRR (at) gmail.com. In writing your abstract, please bear in mind that full papers should suitable for a 30 minute presentation.
What to Submit
June 30, 2011
Crispin Wright’s Philosophical Ramblings
By S. Matthew Liao
This summer Crispin Wright (NIP Director and Professor at NYU) will walk The Pennine Way, 268 miles across the Pennine mountain tops.
The Aim: To raise money to support graduate students from elsewhere to visit the Northern Institute of Philosophy and to support Northern Institute of Philosophy graduate students to visit other institutions. This is in line with a general mission of the Institute to support early career philosophers to develop their interests and skills through collaboration and philosophical interactions. The costs of such visits and exchanges are seldom adequately provided for in the budgets of grant giving authorities, and philosophy departments, even when in principle willing to support research-related travel by graduate students, are less and less able to do so. The hope is to build a Trust Fund at NIP to enable NIP to provide such support as a part of the regular working routine of the Institute.
November 2, 2010
CFP: Copenhagen Conference on Epistemic Inclusiveness and Trust
By S. Matthew Liao
3RD COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE IN EPISTEMOLOGY
THE UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN
AUGUST 15-17, 2011
September 22, 2010
CONF: Epistemic norms from a naturalist viewpoint
By S. Matthew Liao
October 7-8, 2010
Institut Jean-Nicod (Paris)
THURSDAY 7 OCTOBER
Salle Dussane
Ecole Normale Supérieure
45, rue d’Ulm
10h30: Georgy Gergely (Budapest): Psychological Essentialism: The origins of representing artifact kinds.
11h45: Beate Sodian (Munich): Development of epistemic norm sensitivity in children.
13h00: lunch
14h30: Asher Koriat (HaÏfa): Subjective convictions and social consensus: Evidence from research on social attitudes and social beliefs.
15h45: Jennifer Nagel (Toronto): Epistemic anxiety.
17h00: coffee break
17h15: Joëlle Proust (IJN): On the nature of epistemic norms.
18h30: end
19h30: conference dinner
FRIDAY 8 OCTOBER
September 18, 2010
CONF: Naturalism and the Nature of Philosophy
By S. Matthew Liao
47th Cincinnati Philosophy Colloquium
21-23 October 2010
425 Tangeman University Center
University of Cincinnati
Speakers:
• Owen Flanagan, Duke University
• Hilary Kornblith, University of Massachusetts
• Michael Lynch, University of Connecticut
• Penelope Maddy, University of California
• David Papineau, King’s College London
• L. A. Paul, University of North Carolina
• Thomas Polger, University of Cincinnati
• Elliott Sober, University of Wisconsin
Free and open to the public. For more information or to RSVP please contact thomas.polger (at) uc.edu
May 6, 2010
Stockholm Workshop on Ethics and Epistemology
By S. Matthew Liao
Stockholm June Workshop in Philosophy 2010:
Ethics and Epistemology
Thursday 3 June, 10 am – 5 pm,
Room D207, Frescati
Stockholm University
10.00 Welcome
10.05 Brian McElwee (Oxford): ‘The Structure of Demandingness Objections’. Commentator: Katharina Berndt (Stockholm).
11.05 Coffee
11.20 Åsa Wikforss (Stockholm): ‘What Justifies Beliefs about One’s Own Beliefs?’ Commentator: Sara Packalén (Stockholm).
12.20 Lunch
13.40 Karl Karlander (Stockholm): ‘The Varieties of Pain’. Commentator: Jonas Olson (Stockholm).
14.40 Break
14.45 Jonas Åkerman (Stockholm): ’Referential Intentions’. Commentator: Emma Wallin (Stockholm).
15.45 Coffee
16.00 Chris Heathwood (UC Boulder): ‘Could Morality Have a Source’? Commentator: Jens Johansson (Stockholm).
April 7, 2010
Fordham Epistemic Normativity Workshop
By S. Matthew Liao
A workshop on epistemic normativity will be held at Fordham’s Lincoln Center campus in Manhattan, on April 16th and 17th, 2010.
Visitors to the workshop are welcome, and attendance is free. If you are interested in attending, please contact Stephen Grimm at sgrimm (at) fordham.edu. The website for the workshop can be found here. I’ll be attending this fantastic workshop, and I hope to see you there!
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Schedule:
April 16th (location = Law School, Room 430BC)
9:00: welcome and coffee
9:30-10:50
Thomas Kelly (Princeton)
“Following the Argument Where it Leads”
chair: Michael DePaul (Notre Dame)
March 29, 2010
Workshop on theoretical and practical reasons
By Ulrike Heuer
At the Centre for Ethics and Metaethics (CEM), University of Leeds
24th June
2-3:30 Daniel Elstein: ‘Can We Do Without Epistemic Value?’
3:30-3:45 Coffee break
3:45-6:30 Symposium on Reasons and Evidence: Daniel Star, Stephen Kearns and Kieran Setiya
3:45-4:30 Daniel Star & Stephen Kearns: ‘Weighing Reasons’
4:30-5:15 Kieran Setiya: ‘What Is A Reason to Act?’
5:15-6:30 Discussion
from 7pm Drinks and Dinner
25th June
9:30-11 Anna-Sara Malmgren: ‘Sub-Personal Reasons’
11-11:15 Coffee break
11:15-12:45 Selim Berker: ‘Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions’
12:45-2 Lunch
March 29, 2010
CONF: St Andrews-Rutgers Evidence Conference
By S. Matthew Liao
Date: 29 May, 2010 – 30 May, 2010
Location: Parliament Hall, St Andrews
The philosophy departments at St Andrews and Rutgers are holding what looks to be a very interesting joint conference to examine philosophical questions about the nature and epistemic role of evidence.
Programme
Saturday 29th May
10.30–12.30 Ram Neta (UNC, Chapel Hill)
“Easy Knowledge, Bootstrapping, and Higher-Order Reasons”
13.30–15.30 Alvin Goldman (Rutgers)
“Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism”,
16.00–18.00 Susanna Siegel (Harvard)
“Cognitive Penetration as an Undercutter”
October 12, 2009
CFP: St. Louis Conference on Reasons and Rationality
By S. Matthew Liao
The first St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR) will take place May 23-25, 2010 at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. The conference is designed to provide a forum for new work on practical and theoretical reason, broadly construed. Please submit an abstract of 500-1000 words by December 31, 2009 to SLACRR (at) gmail.com. (In writing your abstract, please bear in mind that full papers should suitable for a 30 minute presentation.) We are also interested in finding commentators for papers, so please let us know if you would have an interest
in commenting.
October 10, 2009
Copenhagen Epistemology Workshop
By S. Matthew Liao
Date: October 29, 2009
Venue: Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen (Amager), Room 14.2.50
Schedule:
10.30-12.00: Adam Carter (Edinburgh/Geneva):
Knowledge, Testimony and Philosophical Expertise
13.15-14.45 S. Matthew Liao (Oxford):
Disagreeing with Peers
15.00-16.30: Peter Graham (UC Riverside):
Reliability and Entitlement
16.45-18.15: Mikkel Gerken (SERG, Copenhagen):
Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions
There is no registration fee. However, if you would like to attend the workshop—or have any enquiries concerning the event—please contact Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (nikolaj (at) ucla.edu).
August 28, 2009
Social Epistemology Workshop at Copenhagen
By S. Matthew Liao
The Social Epistemology Research Group (SERG) at the University of Copenhagen is hosting a one-day epistemology workshop. The workshop is part of a series of workshops and conferences to be held in connection with the research project “The Epistemology of Liberal Democracy: Truth, Free Speech, and Disagreement,” funded by the Velux Foundation.
The details are as follows.
September 17, 2009
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
August 5, 2009
Workshop on Disagreement at Copenhagen
By S. Matthew Liao
WORKSHOP ON DISAGREEMENT
August 14, 2009
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
CONFERENCE PROGRAM:
09.00 – 09.15: Coffee and tea
09.15 – 10.00: Berit Brogaard: Reasonable Disagreement and Entitlements to Trust
10.15 – 11.00: Richard Feldman: Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreements.
11.15 – 12.00: Jesper Kallestrup: Bootstrap and Rollback: Epistemic Circularity Generalized.
12.00 – 13.15: Lunch
13.15 – 14.00: Mikkel Gerken: Warrant by Testimony in Contexts of Disagreement and Diversity
14.15 – 15.00: Klemens Kappel and Nikolaj Jang Pedersen: When Can the Non-Conformist Learn from Disagreeing Experts?
15.15 – 16.00: Kristoffer Ahlström: Agency and Amelioration
August 4, 2009
Epistemic Normativity Workshop at Fordham
By S. Matthew Liao
Fordham University is holding a workshop on Epistemic Normativity on April 16th and 17th, 2010.
Fordham University
Lincoln Center Campus
April 16th and 17th, 2010
Speakers:
Jeremy Fantl (Calgary) & Matt McGrath (Missouri)
Richard Foley (NYU)
John Greco (St. Louis)
Thomas Kelly (Princeton)
Michael Lynch (Connecticut)
Linda Martin-Alcoff (CUNY)
Wayne Riggs (Oklahoma)
Dennis Whitcomb (Western Washington)
October 23, 2008
CFP: Philosophical Methodology Conference at Arché
By S. Matthew Liao
This looks like a fantastic conference especially for those who are interested in intuitions and thought experiments. The AHRC Project on ‘Intuitions and Methodology Project’ at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre is hosting a conference on Philosophical Methodology, 25-27 April, 2009, at the University of St. Andrews.
Invited keynote speakers:
David Chalmers (Australian National University)
Jonathan Schaffer (Australian National University, Arché)
Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University)
Tamar Szabó Gendler (Yale University)
The purpose of the conference is to explore questions about philosophical methodology. Potential topics include:
January 29, 2008
Reasons: Explanations or Evidence or Neither?
By Daniel Star
John Broome thinks normative reasons are either explanations or parts of explanations of why you ought to F. Stephen Kearns and I think normative reasons are evidence that you ought to F (and we propose this as a unified analysis that applies across both reasons for action and reasons for belief). Many philosophers working on reasons would reject both of these views, often because they think the concept of a reason is not susceptible to deep analysis. In our most recent paper on this topic, Stephen and I compare our own view with Broome’s, and we do so in a way that should help with more general efforts to assess Broome’s view. This paper, “Reasons: Explanations or Evidence?” can be downloaded here.
January 3, 2008
Jason Stanley’s Bank Case Poll
By S. Matthew Liao
Professor Jason Stanley (Rutgers University) has recently won the American Philosophical Association Book Prize for his book, Knowledge and Practical Interests. In this book, Stanely also tests and develops his theories and principles by means of intuitive judgments about cases. Here is a case from the book:
[Bank Case 1:] Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. Since they have an impending bill coming due, and very little in their account, it is very important that they deposit their paychecks by Saturday. But neither Hannah nor Sarah is aware of the impending bill, nor of the paucity of available funds. Looking at the lines [i.e., at the long queue at the bank], Hannah says to Sarah, ‘I know the bank will be open tomorrow, since I was there just two weeks ago on Saturday morning. So we can deposit our paychecks tomorrow morning.’ (p. 5)
