A workshop on epistemic normativity will be held at Fordham’s Lincoln Center campus in Manhattan, on April 16th and 17th, 2010.

Visitors to the workshop are welcome, and attendance is free. If you are interested in attending, please contact Stephen Grimm at sgrimm (at) fordham.edu. The website for the workshop can be found here. I’ll be attending this fantastic workshop, and I hope to see you there!

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Schedule:

April 16th (location = Law School, Room 430BC)

9:00: welcome and coffee

9:30-10:50
Thomas Kelly (Princeton)
“Following the Argument Where it Leads”
chair: Michael DePaul (Notre Dame)

At the Centre for Ethics and Metaethics (CEM), University of Leeds

Programme

24th June
2-3:30 Daniel Elstein: ‘Can We Do Without Epistemic Value?’

3:30-3:45 Coffee break

3:45-6:30 Symposium on Reasons and Evidence: Daniel Star, Stephen Kearns and Kieran Setiya

3:45-4:30 Daniel Star & Stephen Kearns: ‘Weighing Reasons’
4:30-5:15 Kieran Setiya: ‘What Is A Reason to Act?’
5:15-6:30 Discussion

from 7pm Drinks and Dinner

25th June
9:30-11 Anna-Sara Malmgren: ‘Sub-Personal Reasons’

11-11:15 Coffee break

11:15-12:45 Selim Berker: ‘Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions’

12:45-2 Lunch

Date: 29 May, 2010 – 30 May, 2010
Location: Parliament Hall, St Andrews

The philosophy departments at St Andrews and Rutgers are holding what looks to be a very interesting joint conference to examine philosophical questions about the nature and epistemic role of evidence.

Programme
Saturday 29th May
10.30–12.30 Ram Neta (UNC, Chapel Hill)
“Easy Knowledge, Bootstrapping, and Higher-Order Reasons”
13.30–15.30 Alvin Goldman (Rutgers)
“Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism”,
16.00–18.00 Susanna Siegel (Harvard)
“Cognitive Penetration as an Undercutter”

The first St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR) will take place May 23-25, 2010 at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. The conference is designed to provide a forum for new work on practical and theoretical reason, broadly construed. Please submit an abstract of 500-1000 words by December 31, 2009 to SLACRR (at) gmail.com. (In writing your abstract, please bear in mind that full papers should suitable for a 30 minute presentation.) We are also interested in finding commentators for papers, so please let us know if you would have an interest
in commenting.

Date: October 29, 2009
Venue: Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen (Amager), Room 14.2.50

Schedule:
10.30-12.00: Adam Carter (Edinburgh/Geneva):
Knowledge, Testimony and Philosophical Expertise

13.15-14.45 S. Matthew Liao (Oxford):
Disagreeing with Peers

15.00-16.30: Peter Graham (UC Riverside):
Reliability and Entitlement

16.45-18.15: Mikkel Gerken (SERG, Copenhagen):
Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions

There is no registration fee. However, if you would like to attend the workshop—or have any enquiries concerning the event—please contact Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (nikolaj (at) ucla.edu).

The Social Epistemology Research Group (SERG) at the University of Copenhagen is hosting a one-day epistemology workshop. The workshop is part of a series of workshops and conferences to be held in connection with the research project “The Epistemology of Liberal Democracy: Truth, Free Speech, and Disagreement,” funded by the Velux Foundation.

The details are as follows.

September 17, 2009
University of Copenhagen, Denmark

WORKSHOP ON DISAGREEMENT
August 14, 2009
University of Copenhagen, Denmark

CONFERENCE PROGRAM:
09.00 – 09.15: Coffee and tea
09.15 – 10.00: Berit Brogaard: Reasonable Disagreement and Entitlements to Trust
10.15 – 11.00: Richard Feldman: Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreements.
11.15 – 12.00: Jesper Kallestrup: Bootstrap and Rollback: Epistemic Circularity Generalized.
12.00 – 13.15: Lunch
13.15 – 14.00: Mikkel Gerken: Warrant by Testimony in Contexts of Disagreement and Diversity
14.15 – 15.00: Klemens Kappel and Nikolaj Jang Pedersen: When Can the Non-Conformist Learn from Disagreeing Experts?
15.15 – 16.00: Kristoffer Ahlström: Agency and Amelioration

Fordham University is holding a workshop on Epistemic Normativity on April 16th and 17th, 2010.

Fordham University
Lincoln Center Campus
April 16th and 17th, 2010

Speakers:
Jeremy Fantl (Calgary) & Matt McGrath (Missouri)
Richard Foley (NYU)
John Greco (St. Louis)
Thomas Kelly (Princeton)
Michael Lynch (Connecticut)
Linda Martin-Alcoff (CUNY)
Wayne Riggs (Oklahoma)
Dennis Whitcomb (Western Washington)

This looks like a fantastic conference especially for those who are interested in intuitions and thought experiments. The AHRC Project on ‘Intuitions and Methodology Project’ at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre is hosting a conference on Philosophical Methodology, 25-27 April, 2009, at the University of St. Andrews.

Invited keynote speakers:
David Chalmers (Australian National University)
Jonathan Schaffer (Australian National University, Arché)
Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University)
Tamar Szabó Gendler (Yale University)

The purpose of the conference is to explore questions about philosophical methodology. Potential topics include:

John Broome thinks normative reasons are either explanations or parts of explanations of why you ought to F. Stephen Kearns and I think normative reasons are evidence that you ought to F (and we propose this as a unified analysis that applies across both reasons for action and reasons for belief). Many philosophers working on reasons would reject both of these views, often because they think the concept of a reason is not susceptible to deep analysis. In our most recent paper on this topic, Stephen and I compare our own view with Broome’s, and we do so in a way that should help with more general efforts to assess Broome’s view. This paper, “Reasons: Explanations or Evidence?” can be downloaded here.

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