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	<title>Ethics Etc &#187; Guy Kahane&#8217;s Posts</title>
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		<title>Appiah’s Experiments in Ethics: Chapter 5</title>
		<link>http://ethics-etc.com/2008/04/28/appiah%e2%80%99s-experiments-in-ethics-chapter-5/</link>
		<comments>http://ethics-etc.com/2008/04/28/appiah%e2%80%99s-experiments-in-ethics-chapter-5/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Apr 2008 14:50:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Guy Kahane</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Appiah Reading Group]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Experimental Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Guy Kahane's Posts]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ethics-etc.com/2008/04/28/appiah%e2%80%99s-experiments-in-ethics-chapter-5/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Towards the end of the chapter Appiah remarks that the greatest works in ethics exhibit a deep, irrepressible heterogeneity, heterogeneity that reflects a richness and complexity of the ethical life he believes that many moral philosophers overlook in their quest for neat (even: intricate) theories. This last chapter is certainly heterogeneous: starting with remarks on [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>3</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Utilitarianism and the Brain</title>
		<link>http://ethics-etc.com/2008/03/21/utilitarianism-and-the-brain/</link>
		<comments>http://ethics-etc.com/2008/03/21/utilitarianism-and-the-brain/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 Mar 2008 21:49:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Guy Kahane</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Guy Kahane's Posts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Metaethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Moral Psychology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Neuroscience of Morality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Normative Ethics]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Everybody’s heard about Joshua Greene’s fMRI studies of moral judgement. Many have also heard about the study by Koenigs, Young, Adolphs, Cushman, Tranel, Cushman, Hauser and Damasio of patients with prefrontal damage. In a communication I co-authored with Nick Shackel and which has just come out in Nature, we criticise the methodology used in these [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>3</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Realism and Semantics</title>
		<link>http://ethics-etc.com/2008/01/09/realism-and-semantics/</link>
		<comments>http://ethics-etc.com/2008/01/09/realism-and-semantics/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Jan 2008 17:42:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Guy Kahane</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Guy Kahane's Posts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Metaethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophy of Language]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ethics-etc.com/2008/01/09/realism-and-semantics/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[J. L. Mackie did a great service to metaethics by distinguishing, as previous philosophers hadn’t, between semantics and metaphysics.* He pointed out that it’s one thing to show that our normative concepts refer to objective properties, quite another to show that anything out there actually corresponds to these concepts. Defending normative realism therefore turns out to be harder than previously thought: winning the argument about the semantics only takes you halfway. 
]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>9</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Kamm&#8217;s Intricate Ethics: Chapter 7</title>
		<link>http://ethics-etc.com/2007/08/17/kamm-reading-group-chapter-7/</link>
		<comments>http://ethics-etc.com/2007/08/17/kamm-reading-group-chapter-7/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Aug 2007 20:06:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Guy Kahane</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Bioethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Guy Kahane's Posts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kamm Reading Group]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Normative Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Value Theory]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[This chapter on moral status is very short, and also mercifully short on intricate imaginary examples. Kamm quickly takes us through a number of relatively familiar normative distinctions and I will try to be brief in recounting them here. In the broadest sense, moral status simply refers to, roughly, an entity’s moral properties: Moral status [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://ethics-etc.com/2007/08/17/kamm-reading-group-chapter-7/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>10</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Extrinsic Final Value or Expressive Value?</title>
		<link>http://ethics-etc.com/2007/08/08/extrinsic-final-value-or-expressive-value/</link>
		<comments>http://ethics-etc.com/2007/08/08/extrinsic-final-value-or-expressive-value/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Aug 2007 13:46:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Guy Kahane</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Guy Kahane's Posts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Value Theory]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ethics-etc.com/2007/08/08/extrinsic-final-value-or-expressive-value/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In her ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’, Christine Korsgaard drew attention to an overlooked distinction between two distinctions about value. One is the distinction between final and instrumental value. The other is that between intrinsic and extrinsic value. Something has instrumental value only if we desire it for the sake of some further end; something has [...]]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>19</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Unbearable Pain, Death, and the Rational Self</title>
		<link>http://ethics-etc.com/2007/06/05/unbearable-pain-death-and-the-rational-self/</link>
		<comments>http://ethics-etc.com/2007/06/05/unbearable-pain-death-and-the-rational-self/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 05 Jun 2007 11:24:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Guy Kahane</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Applied Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Guy Kahane's Posts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Normative Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Value Theory]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ethics-etc.com/2007/06/05/unbearable-pain-death-and-the-rational-self/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[1. I don’t especially mind death, but I’m scared of pain. As Epicurus reminds us, death doesn’t hurt. Epicurus may have been mistaken to think that this was enough to show that death isn’t bad, but it is good to know that death is at least not bad in this one important respect. 
            
            There are paradoxical sounding remarks by David Velleman that seem to imply that even pain itself, when it is as its worst, may not be bad in this one respect. In his paper ‘A Right to Self-Termination’, Velleman writes 
 
             “Pain is a bad thing, of course, but ... what justifies death is the unbearableness of the pain rather than the painfulness. What do we mean in calling pain unbearable? What is it not to bear pain? … Not to bear pain is somehow to fall apart in the face of it, to disintegrate as a person. To find pain unbearable is to find it this destructive not just of one's well-being but of oneself. But then we make a mistake if we describe the patient in unbearable pain as if he were his rational old self, weighing the harm of pain against the benefits of existence. If his pain is truly unbearable, then he isn't his rational self any longer: he is falling apart in pain. Even if he enjoys some moments of relief and clarity, he is still falling apart diachronically, a temporally scattered person at best.”
 
So perhaps when pain is at its worst, it isn’t bad either. It is no longer bad because unendurable pain is like death. And death, we’ve just seen, doesn’t hurt!
 
            This should reassure those who believe that there is a hell, and that hell is unbearable pain without end... 
]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>7</slash:comments>
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