MORAL MOTIVATION: EVIDENCE AND RELEVANCE
Gothenburg, Sweden
May 18-20, 2012
Abstracts Submission Deadline: January 20, 2012

INVITED SPEAKERS:
James Dreier, Brown University
Can Reasons Fundamentalism Answer the Normative Question?

Jeanette Kennett, Macquarie University
Moral Motivation and Its Impairments: Empirical and Philosophical Approaches

Jesse Prinz, CUNY
An Empirical Case for Emotionally Based Internalism

Michael Ridge, University of Edinburgh
Internalism: Cui Bono?

Michael Smith, Princeton University
Moral Judgements, Judgements about Reasons, and Motivations

Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Ohio State University
Detecting Value with Motivational Responses

Jon Tresan, UNC Chapel Hill
Objective Moral Realism & The Role-Individuation of Moral Judgments

When: July 2-4, 2012
Where: Edinburgh (venue TBA)

A long-standing assumption in meta-ethics is that moral thought and language is either purely cognitive or purely non-cognitive. But this has recently been called into question. For whilst such pure theories seem to easily explain some elements of moral thought and language they seem to have a hard time explaining or accommodating others. This has led to the development of so-called hybrid theories, which take moral thought and language to combine cognitive and non-cognitive elements in some way. This conference brings together a large number of those presently working on hybrid theories to examine the prospects of these theories in meta-ethics, and the meta-normative more generally, and in other areas where similar theories have been proposed, such as how pejorative terms work.

2012 CONFERENCE
University of Stirling, UK
Mon 9th – Wed 11th July 2012

Keynote Speakers:
Sarah Broadie (St Andrews)
Frances Kamm (Harvard)

Papers are invited for the 2012 annual conference of the British Society for Ethical Theory, to be held at the University of Stirling, following directly on from the Joint Session. The subject area is open within metaethics and normative ethics. Papers on topics in applied ethics, moral psychology or the history of ethics may also be considered provided they are also of wider theoretical interest.

CFA: SLACRR 3
By S. Matthew Liao

May 20 – 22, 2012
Moonrise Hotel in St Louis, MO

Keynote Speaker:
Jonathan Dancy (Reading/Texas)

St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR) provides a forum for new work on practical and theoretical reason, broadly construed.

Please submit an abstract of 750-1500 words by December 31, 2011 to SLACRR (at) gmail.com. In writing your abstract, please bear in mind that full papers should suitable for a 30 minute presentation.

What to Submit

The Truth of Ethics
February 24-25, 2012
Fordham University

Keynote Speaker:
Prof. Stephen Darwall (Yale University)

Papers of high quality relating to the topic “the Truth of Ethics,” broadly construed are invited. Paper topics may address issues in moral epistemology, normative and meta-ethical theory, competing theories of truth, moral psychology, applied ethics, and other related areas.

Sample questions include:

What does moral reasoning tell us about the nature of reason in general?

Do moral propositions have truth values? If so, how do we know them?

If not, then what is their status?

Boghossian on Moral Relativism
By S. Matthew Liao

Here is an insightful piece on moral relativism in the New York Times by Paul Boghossian, Silver Professor of Philosophy at New York University. Definitely worth the read.

University of Gothenburg, Sweden
August 17-18th 2011

The relation between moral judgments and moral motivation is a central issue in ethical theory, having implications for the nature of moral judgments, the meaning of normative terms, and the possibility of objective truth and knowledge in morality. According to a strong form of motivational internalism, the relation is both intrinsic and necessary: to judge that an act is morally wrong is (at least in part) to be motivated not to perform it. When combined with a humean theory of motivation, this form of internalism has often been seen as incompatible with moral cognitivism or objectivism.

CF: BSET 2011 at Oxford
By S. Matthew Liao

The British Society for Ethical Theory
Annual Conference

St Anne’s College, University of Oxford, 11 – 13 July

Keynote Speakers: Mike Otsuka (UCL) and Susan Wolf (UNC Chapel Hill)

Registration is now open.
Registration form and a list of papers are available here:
http://www.bset.org.uk/2011.html

***Book before 17th June to avoid the late booking fee***

Local organizer: Edward Harcourt, edward.harcourt (at) philosophy.ox.ac.uk

BSET 2011 Schedule
By S. Matthew Liao

A tentative schedule for the 2011 British Society for Ethical Theory Conference is now out, with several Ethics-Etc Contributors on the programme.

Monday 11th – Wednesday 13th July
St Anne’s College, Oxford
http://www.bset.org.uk/2011.html

Keynote Speakers
Mike Otsuka (UCL)
Susan Wolf (UNC Chapel Hill)

Submitted Papers

A Locative Analysis of “Good For”
– Guy Fletcher (Oxford)

Medusa’s Gaze Reflected: A Darwinian Dilemma for Anti-Realist Theories of Value
– Abraham Garber (Iowa)

Direction of Fit
– Alex Gregory (Reading)

A Lover’s Shame
– Ward Jones (Rhodes)

Rule Consequentialism and Disasters
– Leonard Kahn (US Air Force Academy)

5th Annual Midwest Ethics Society Conference
Saturday, April 30, 2011
Missouri State University
Springfield, Missouri

Keynote Speaker:
Geoffrey Sayre-Mccord
University Of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Papers On Any Topic In Applied Ethics, Normative Ethical Theory, Or Metaethics Will Be Considered.

Please Submit A Titledabstract Of 200–300 Words By March 7, 2011, To:

Andrew Johnson
Philosophy Department
Missouri State University
901 South National Avenue
Springfield, Mo 65897
E-Mail: Andrewjohnson (at) Missouristate.Edu
(E-Mail Submissions Welcome)

Authors Of Accepted Abstracts Will Be Notified In Mid-March And Invited To Present A 3,000–4,000-Word Paper.

There is a call for abstracts for the Eighth Annual Metaethics Workshop, to be held at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, on September 16-18, 2011. Christine Korsgaard (Harvard) will be this year’s keynote speaker. Abstracts (of 2-3 double-spaced pages) of papers in any area of metaethics are due by May 1. There is a limit of one submission per person. Speakers in the 2009 or 2010 workshop are not eligible to submit abstracts for this year’s event. A program committee will evaluate submissions and make decisions by early June.

5th Annual Conference of the Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy
Northwestern University
May 19–21, 2011

Keynote speakers: Philip Pettit and R. Jay Wallace

Conference website (with call for papers): http://www.philosophy.northwestern.edu/conferences/moralpolitical/

Submissions from both faculty and graduate students are invited. Essay topics in all areas of ethical theory and political philosophy will be considered, although some priority will be given to essays that take up themes from the works of Philip Pettit and R. Jay Wallace. The submission deadline is February 15, 2011.

University of Colorado, Boulder
August 4-7, 2011

The Center for Values and Social Policy in the Philosophy Department at the University of Colorado, Boulder is pleased to invite paper proposals for the fourth annual RoME congress. Papers from all areas of ethics and political theory are invited. To encourage the participation of junior scholars, the University of Colorado will be awarding a Young Ethicist Prize of $500 for most meritorious submission. The prize competition is open to any participating untenured philosopher (including, but not limited to, tenure-track faculty, instructors, and graduate students).

Moral philosophers disagree about a lot of stuff.  They disagree, for example, on whether moral properties exist and, if so, what the heck they are and how we have knowledge of them; on whether one can derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ and, if not, whether this really matters or not; on whether moral judgments are the deliverances of affective or purely cognitive faculties; on whether moral omissions have the same status as moral comissions; and a whole lot besides.

One particular claim, though, seems to have widespread endorsement—the claim that ordinary folk are objectivists when it comes to morality.  According to this view, ordinary folk believe moral issues admit of a single correct answer, and reject the idea that two people with conflicting positions on a moral issue may both be right.  This claim of  ’folk objectivism’ enjoys a surprising degree of consensus, and can be found in the works of a diverse range of moral philosophers with disparate theoretical commitments (e.g. Blackburn 1984; Brink 1989; Gibbard 1992; Mackie 1977; Shafer-Landau 2003).  It is a datum that most metaethical theories try to vindicate or accommodate.  But is this claim correct?  The answer would seem to be important, as the claim of folk objectivism has played a significant role in theorizing about the nature of ethics.

Cluster of Excellence “The Formation of Normative Orders” at Frankfurt University

Cluster Lecture Series Winter Semester 2010/11:
The Nature of Normativity

Goethe-Universität Frankfurt a.M. / Campus Westend / Hörsaalzentrum / HZ5

Programme

Wednesday, 1 December 2010, 6pm
Professor Robert Pippin (University of Chicago)
Reason’s Form

Wednesday, 8 December 2010, 6pm
Professor Christine Korsgaard (Harvard University)
The Normative Constitution of Agency

Wednesday, 15 December 2010, 6pm
Professor Joseph Raz (Columbia University)
Normativity: what is it and how can it be explained?

Wednesday, 12 January 2011, 6pm
Professor Thomas M. Scanlon (Harvard University)
Metaphysical Objections to Normative Truth

Workshop on Michael Smith
By S. Matthew Liao

Michael Smith: “Meta-Ethics, Action Theory, Consequentialism”
Location: Bielefeld, Germany
Date: November 16th – 18th 2010

Tuesday, November 16th: META-ETHICS
9.00 – 12.00: In Defence of The Moral Problem
14.00 – 17.00: Beyond the Error Theory

Wednesday, November 17th: ACTION THEORY
9.00 – 12.00: The Possibility of Philosophy of Action
14.00 – 17.00: Scanlon on Desire and the Explanation of Action

Thursday, November 18th: CONSEQUENTIALISM
9.00 – 12.00: Two Kinds of Consequentialism
14.00 – 17.00: On Normativity

More detailed information is available at
http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/philosophie/smith/

The program for the 7th Annual Metaethics Workshop has been finalized and can be found here. It looks fantastic! The workshop will be held on Sept 24-26, 2010 in Madison, WI. Registration is free and all are welcome. If you would like to attend, please email Professor Russ Shafer-Landau (shaferlandau -at- wisc.edu).

Professor Nishi Shah (Amherst) recent gave a paper, which he co-wrote with Matt Evans (NYU), at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar entitled “Mental Agency and Metaethics.” A copy of Nishi’s talk can be found here. Professor Shah would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:

Professor Alan Thomas (Tilburg University) will be giving a talk on Monday, June 7, at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar entitled “Practical Reasoning, the First Person and Impartialism about Reasons.” A copy of Professor Thomas’s talk can be found here. Professor Thomas would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:

The Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at MIT will host a one day conference on Judy Thomson‘s recent book Normativity. All are welcome.

Date: Friday 11 June 2010
Location: Stata Center (map), MIT. Room 32-d461 (take the elevator in the Dreyfoos Tower to the Fourth Floor; map)

Schedule:
10.30 – 12.00
Peter Railton (Michigan)
1.00 – 2.30
Gideon Rosen (Princeton)
3.00 – 4.30
Michael Smith (Princeton)
4.45 – 5.45
Round-table discussion with the speakers and Judy Thomson

http://web.mit.edu/holton/www/confs/Judyconf/judyconf.html

Organizer: Richard Holton – holton (at) mit.edu

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