September 6-8, 2012
Purdue University

The conference will focus on three main challenges to religious and moral beliefs:
• Widespread interpersonal disagreement among intellectual peers on religious and on moral topics provides reason to doubt these beliefs;
• Belief-source disagreement on moral issues between commonsense moral intuitions and religious belief sources raises doubts about both methods of belief formation;
• Evolutionary accounts of the origins of our religious and moral beliefs create doubts about these beliefs by undermining our confidence in the reliability of their sources.

Special Issue on The Nature of the Enkratic Requirement of Rationality
Organon F – International Journal of Analytic Philosophy
Guest Editor: Julian Fink (University of Vienna)
Submission deadline: October 1st 2012

Confirmed contributors:
John Broome (Oxford)
John Brunero (Missouri-St Louis)
Herlinde Pauer-Studer (Vienna)
Christian Piller (York)
Andrew Reisner (McGill)
Jonathan Way (Southampton)
Ralph Wedgwood (USC)

Invited contributors:
Robert Audi (Notre Dame)
Olav Gjelsvik (Oslo)
Pamela Hieronymi (UCLA)

May 9-10, 2012
Amphithéâtre Gustave Roussy – Centre de Recherche des Cordeliers
15 rue de l’Ecole de Médecine, 75006 Paris
Organizers : Joëlle Proust and Anne Coubray (Institut Jean-Nicod)

WEDNESDAY 9 MAY
10:00 a.m. Speaker : Allan Gibbard (Michigan) : Full Truth for Expressivists: Deflationary Truth and Acceptability.
Respondent : Joëlle Proust (ENS, IJN).
12:00 a.m. Lunch
2:00 p.m. Speaker : Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (Copenhagen) : The Costs of Epistemic Realism.
Respondent : Friedericke Moltmann (CNRS, IHPST).
4:00 p.m. Coffee break
4:30 p.m. Speaker : Seth Yalcin (Berkeley) : Knowledge in the Absence of Truth.
Respondent : Paul Egré (CNRS, IJN).
6:30 p.m. End

CF: BSET 2012 in Stirling
By S. Matthew Liao

9 – 11 July, 2012
University of Stirling,

Keynote Speakers
Sarah Broadie (St Andrews)
Frances Kamm (Harvard)

Submitted Papers
Science’s Immunity to Moral Refutation
– Alex Barber (Open)

Specialising General Duties
– Stephanie Collins (ANU)

Cognitivism about Moral Judgement
– Alison Hills (Oxford)

The Department of Philosophy at the University of Reading invites you to the annual Ratio Conference on Friday 20 April 2012.

This year’s theme is Irrealism in Ethics.

Speakers:
Jonas Olson (University of Stockholm): ‘Precursors of Moral Error Theory’
James Lenman (University of Sheffield): ‘Ethics without Errors’
Michael Ridge and Sebastian Köhler (University of Edinburgh): ‘Revolutionary Expressivism’
Mark Kalderon (University College London): ‘The Philosophical Significance of the Frege-Geach Problem’

Registration fee: £15 (staff), £10 (students), which includes tea and coffee during the day.

The conference programme and registration form are available at http://www.reading.ac.uk/philosophy/Conferences/Conferences.aspx

SLACRR 3 – Program
By S. Matthew Liao

Here are the main speakers at the next St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality, May 20-22, 2012.

Keynote: Jonathan Dancy (Texas/Reading), “More Right than Wrong”

* Nomy Arpaly (Brown) and Timothy Schroeder (Ohio State), “Acting and Believing for Reasons”
* Agnes Callard (Chicago), ”Introducing Socratic Anti-Intellectualism”
* Patricio Fernandez (Harvard), “Why Not Act?
* Ernesto Garcia (Massachusetts), “Explaining Constitutive Norms”
* Alex Gregory (Reading), “A Very Good Reason to Reject the Buck-Passing Account” * Ali Hasan (Iowa), “A Puzzle for Analyses of Rationality”
* Doug Portmore (Arizona State), “Perform Your Best Option”
* Abe Roth (Ohio State), “Team Reasoning, Shared Intention, and Non-Evidential Warrant for Belief”
* Michael Titelbaum (Wisconsin), “In Defense of Right Reasons”
* Daniel Whiting (Southampton), ”Reasons for Belief, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action”

Reply to Sobel
By Allen Wood

I am grateful that my post on Ethics Etc. finally reached David Sobel, and that he has taken the trouble to respond to it. On the face of it, his response looks pretty devastating – I am sure it must seem so to him. But I offer the following rejoinder:

I suppose I should have anticipated this reply, given the way Parfit presents what he calls ‘the agony argument’ and the way in which Sobel in his article exploits the notions of liking and disliking. Nor can it be my aim to speak for Parfit or defend the letter of his texts (he is surely more able to do that for himself than I could possibly be on his behalf). My aim, however, was to criticize the strategy Sobel uses in defending subjectivism about reasons against Parfit’s objections. In a short post, it was impossible for me to do this in a way that avoids misunderstanding. For this reason, the present note is quite a bit longer, because it will take longer to explain what I believe to be at issue. I agree that Sobel’s reply seems quite apt in relation to the letter of what Parfit says. However, this reply also perpetuates the fatal confusion on which I believe the argument of Sobel’s article rests.

The Department of Philosophy at Saint Louis University will be hosting the Henle Conference on Happiness and Well-Being on March 30-31, 2012. A tentative schedule appears below.

There is a call for abstracts for the Ninth Annual Metaethics Workshop, to be held at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, on September 28-30, 2012.

Jonathan Dancy (Reading and Texas) will be this year’s keynote speaker. Abstracts (of 2-3 double-spaced pages) of papers in any area of metaethics are due by May 1. There is a limit of one submission per person. Speakers in the 2010 or 2011 workshop are not eligible to submit abstracts for this year’s event. A program committee will evaluate submissions and make decisions by early June.

MORAL MOTIVATION: EVIDENCE AND RELEVANCE
Gothenburg, Sweden
May 18-20, 2012
Abstracts Submission Deadline: January 20, 2012

INVITED SPEAKERS:
James Dreier, Brown University
Can Reasons Fundamentalism Answer the Normative Question?

Jeanette Kennett, Macquarie University
Moral Motivation and Its Impairments: Empirical and Philosophical Approaches

Jesse Prinz, CUNY
An Empirical Case for Emotionally Based Internalism

Michael Ridge, University of Edinburgh
Internalism: Cui Bono?

Michael Smith, Princeton University
Moral Judgements, Judgements about Reasons, and Motivations

Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Ohio State University
Detecting Value with Motivational Responses

Jon Tresan, UNC Chapel Hill
Objective Moral Realism & The Role-Individuation of Moral Judgments

When: July 2-4, 2012
Where: Edinburgh (venue TBA)

A long-standing assumption in meta-ethics is that moral thought and language is either purely cognitive or purely non-cognitive. But this has recently been called into question. For whilst such pure theories seem to easily explain some elements of moral thought and language they seem to have a hard time explaining or accommodating others. This has led to the development of so-called hybrid theories, which take moral thought and language to combine cognitive and non-cognitive elements in some way. This conference brings together a large number of those presently working on hybrid theories to examine the prospects of these theories in meta-ethics, and the meta-normative more generally, and in other areas where similar theories have been proposed, such as how pejorative terms work.

2012 CONFERENCE
University of Stirling, UK
Mon 9th – Wed 11th July 2012

Keynote Speakers:
Sarah Broadie (St Andrews)
Frances Kamm (Harvard)

Papers are invited for the 2012 annual conference of the British Society for Ethical Theory, to be held at the University of Stirling, following directly on from the Joint Session. The subject area is open within metaethics and normative ethics. Papers on topics in applied ethics, moral psychology or the history of ethics may also be considered provided they are also of wider theoretical interest.

CFA: SLACRR 3
By S. Matthew Liao

May 20 – 22, 2012
Moonrise Hotel in St Louis, MO

Keynote Speaker:
Jonathan Dancy (Reading/Texas)

St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR) provides a forum for new work on practical and theoretical reason, broadly construed.

Please submit an abstract of 750-1500 words by December 31, 2011 to SLACRR (at) gmail.com. In writing your abstract, please bear in mind that full papers should suitable for a 30 minute presentation.

What to Submit

The Truth of Ethics
February 24-25, 2012
Fordham University

Keynote Speaker:
Prof. Stephen Darwall (Yale University)

Papers of high quality relating to the topic “the Truth of Ethics,” broadly construed are invited. Paper topics may address issues in moral epistemology, normative and meta-ethical theory, competing theories of truth, moral psychology, applied ethics, and other related areas.

Sample questions include:

What does moral reasoning tell us about the nature of reason in general?

Do moral propositions have truth values? If so, how do we know them?

If not, then what is their status?

Boghossian on Moral Relativism
By S. Matthew Liao

Here is an insightful piece on moral relativism in the New York Times by Paul Boghossian, Silver Professor of Philosophy at New York University. Definitely worth the read.

University of Gothenburg, Sweden
August 17-18th 2011

The relation between moral judgments and moral motivation is a central issue in ethical theory, having implications for the nature of moral judgments, the meaning of normative terms, and the possibility of objective truth and knowledge in morality. According to a strong form of motivational internalism, the relation is both intrinsic and necessary: to judge that an act is morally wrong is (at least in part) to be motivated not to perform it. When combined with a humean theory of motivation, this form of internalism has often been seen as incompatible with moral cognitivism or objectivism.

CF: BSET 2011 at Oxford
By S. Matthew Liao

The British Society for Ethical Theory
Annual Conference

St Anne’s College, University of Oxford, 11 – 13 July

Keynote Speakers: Mike Otsuka (UCL) and Susan Wolf (UNC Chapel Hill)

Registration is now open.
Registration form and a list of papers are available here:
http://www.bset.org.uk/2011.html

***Book before 17th June to avoid the late booking fee***

Local organizer: Edward Harcourt, edward.harcourt (at) philosophy.ox.ac.uk

BSET 2011 Schedule
By S. Matthew Liao

A tentative schedule for the 2011 British Society for Ethical Theory Conference is now out, with several Ethics-Etc Contributors on the programme.

Monday 11th – Wednesday 13th July
St Anne’s College, Oxford
http://www.bset.org.uk/2011.html

Keynote Speakers
Mike Otsuka (UCL)
Susan Wolf (UNC Chapel Hill)

Submitted Papers

A Locative Analysis of “Good For”
– Guy Fletcher (Oxford)

Medusa’s Gaze Reflected: A Darwinian Dilemma for Anti-Realist Theories of Value
– Abraham Garber (Iowa)

Direction of Fit
– Alex Gregory (Reading)

A Lover’s Shame
– Ward Jones (Rhodes)

Rule Consequentialism and Disasters
– Leonard Kahn (US Air Force Academy)

5th Annual Midwest Ethics Society Conference
Saturday, April 30, 2011
Missouri State University
Springfield, Missouri

Keynote Speaker:
Geoffrey Sayre-Mccord
University Of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Papers On Any Topic In Applied Ethics, Normative Ethical Theory, Or Metaethics Will Be Considered.

Please Submit A Titledabstract Of 200–300 Words By March 7, 2011, To:

Andrew Johnson
Philosophy Department
Missouri State University
901 South National Avenue
Springfield, Mo 65897
E-Mail: Andrewjohnson (at) Missouristate.Edu
(E-Mail Submissions Welcome)

Authors Of Accepted Abstracts Will Be Notified In Mid-March And Invited To Present A 3,000–4,000-Word Paper.

There is a call for abstracts for the Eighth Annual Metaethics Workshop, to be held at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, on September 16-18, 2011. Christine Korsgaard (Harvard) will be this year’s keynote speaker. Abstracts (of 2-3 double-spaced pages) of papers in any area of metaethics are due by May 1. There is a limit of one submission per person. Speakers in the 2009 or 2010 workshop are not eligible to submit abstracts for this year’s event. A program committee will evaluate submissions and make decisions by early June.

keep looking »