Welcome Laura Franklin-Hall!
By S. Matthew Liao

We are very pleased that Professor Laura Franklin-Hall has joined us as a Contributor. Laura is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at New York University, and specializes in the philosophy of biology. She has published numerous articles in Philosophy of Science and also has an active interest in the implications of evolutionary theories for metaethics. Welcome aboard, Laura!

Hi all, I just wanted to call your attention to the following:

Call For Papers
Spindel Prize for Emerging Scholar in Philosophy
2010 Spindel Conference Topic: Empathy and Ethics
Conference Director: Remy Debes

The University of Memphis Department of Philosophy is proud to announce that the topic for the 29th annual Spindel Conference will be “Empathy and Ethics.”

I just finished a draft of a paper called “Bias and Reasoning: Haidt’s Theory of Moral Judgment.” Eventually, the final version of the paper will go into an edited collection called New Waves in Ethics, edited by Thom Brooks. In the meantime, I’d be really interested to learn what some of you think of this paper. An abstract of the paper is as follows:

Roger Crisp had an article in Mind in 2008 entitled “Goodness and Reasons: Accentuating the Negative.” Mind just published a piece discussing Crisp’s 2008 article by Philip Stratton-Lake, as well Crisp’s response to Stratton-Lake, both of which look very interesting. I also have a piece called “The Buck-Passing Account of Value: Lessons from Crisp,” which also discusses Crisp’s 2008 article and which is available via Philosophical Studies’ Online First, or here for a penultimate version. I had a quick look at Stratton-Lake’s piece and Crisp’s response, and as far as I can tell, the points I make in my paper are different from Stratton-Lake’s. I’ll be reading Stratton-Lake’s and Crisp’s papers more closely soon, but in the meantime, I’d be very interested to learn what other people think of them.

Raz on The Guise of the Good
By S. Matthew Liao

Professor Joseph Raz (Columbia and Oxford University) will be giving a talk on Monday, Feb. 8, at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar entitled ‘On the Guise of the Good.’ A copy of Professor Raz’s talk can be found here. Professor Raz would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:

University of Wisconsin, Madison
September 24-26, 2010

Stephen Darwall (Yale) will be this year’s keynote speaker. Abstracts (of 2-3 double-spaced pages) of papers in any area of metaethics are due by May 1. There is a limit of one submission per person. Speakers in the 2008 or 2009 workshop are not eligible to submit abstracts for this year’s event. A program committee will evaluate submissions and make decisions by early June.

Information on submitting an abstract, plus much other relevant information about the workshop, can be obtained at the workshop website: https://mywebspace.wisc.edu/shaferlandau/web/metaethics/workshop_2010/

Value Concepts Workshop
University of Leeds
March 5-6, 2010

Matti Eklund (Cornell)
“Misevaluation, Moral Semantics, and Moral Realism”

Janice Dowell (Nebraska)
“A Flexible, Contextualist Account of ‘Ought’”

Antti Kauppinen (Amsterdam)
“A Defence of Moral Invariantism”

Simon Kirchin (Kent)
“Determinables, Determinates, and Thick Concepts”

Daniel Elstein (Leeds)
“Why There Can Be No Good Reason to Accept the Shapelessness Hypothesis”

Debbie Roberts (Reading)
“Evaluation and Variability: Why Thick Concepts Are Not Determinates of the Thin”

More information is available at http://leedsvalueconcepts.wordpress.com/. Registration is free.

JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY:
An International Journal of Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy

(ISSN 1740-4681)

Volume 7, Number 1 (2010)

ARTICLES

William Sin, ‘Trivial Sacrifices, Great Demands’, pp. 3-15

Lina Papadaki, ‘What is Objectification?’ pp. 16-36

M. B. E. Smith, ‘Does Humanity Share a Common Moral Faculty?’ pp. 37-53

Jonathan Seglow, ‘Associative Duties and Global Justice’, pp. 54-73

Miriam Ronzoni, ‘Constructivism and Practical Reason: On Intersubjectivity, Abstraction, and Judgment’, pp. 74-104

Kenneth R. Westphal, ‘From “Convention” to “Ethical Life”: Hume’s Theory of Justice in Post-Kantian Perspective’, pp. 105-32

REVIEW ARTICLE

JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY:
An International Journal of Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy
(ISSN 1740-4681)

Volume 6, Number 4 (2009)

ARTICLES

Ty Landrum, ‘Persons as Objects of Love’, pp. 417-39

Elizabeth Tropman, ‘Renewing Moral Intuitionism’, pp. 440-63

David Alm, ‘Deontological Restrictions and the Good/Bad Asymmetry’, pp. 464-81

Carl Knight, ‘Egalitarian Justice and Valuational Judgment’, pp. 482-98

Geoffrey Scarre, ‘The “Banality of Good”?’ pp. 499-519

REVIEW ARTICLE

Sean Coyle, ‘The Ideality of Law’, pp. 521-34

BOOK REVIEWS

Stefan Bird-Pollan on The Founding Act of Modern Ethical Life: Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy by Ideo Geiger, pp. 535-37

Professor Ralph Wedgwood (Oxford University) will be giving a talk today at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar entitled ‘Instrumental Rationality.’ A copy of Ralph’s talk can be found here and a handout for his talk is here. Ralph would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:

Continuum Ethics
A series of books exploring key topics in contemporary ethics and moral philosophy.

Continuum Ethics presents a series of books that will bridge the gap between new research work and undergraduate textbooks. They will provide close examination of key concepts in contemporary moral philosophy. Aimed largely at upper-level undergraduates and research students, they will also appeal to researchers in the field. Authors will be expected to combine philosophical sophistication with an accessible style that can engage the educated reader.

Date: July 3-4 2010
Location: The Informatics Conference Centre, George Square, Edinburgh

Speakers:
Talbot Brewer (University of Virginia)
John Cottingham (University of Reading)
Jonathan Dancy (University of Reading/ Texas)
Brad Hooker (University of Reading)
Edward Harcourt (Keble College, Oxford)
James Lenman (University of Sheffield)
Tim Mulgan (University of St Andrews)
Michael Ridge (University of Edinburgh) & Sean McKeever (Davidson College, NC, USA)
Tom Sorell (University of Birmingham)
Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto)
Alan Thomas (University of Kent)

Jointly organised by the Philosophy Departments, The Open University and The University of Edinburgh, with support from The Mind Association, The Royal Institute of Philosophy, and The Scots Philosophical Club

Professor Torbjörn Tännsjö (Stockholm University) will be giving a talk next Monday at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar entitled ‘In Defence of Moral Realism.’ A copy of Torbjörn’s talk can be found here and he would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:

I will present some ideas from a forthcoming book, “From Reasons to Norms: On the Basic Question in Ethics (Springer, forthcoming). I will argue that there is a unique and objective answer to the question what we ought to do, simpliciter. I will rebut Mackie’s arguments from queerness and relativity, and Harman’s empiricist argument in defence of moral nihilism, and following Ewing, Nagel, and Dworkin, I will argue that we are allowed to turn the content of our moral beliefs against the nihilist thesis.

The first St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR) will take place May 23-25, 2010 at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. The conference is designed to provide a forum for new work on practical and theoretical reason, broadly construed. Please submit an abstract of 500-1000 words by December 31, 2009 to SLACRR (at) gmail.com. (In writing your abstract, please bear in mind that full papers should suitable for a 30 minute presentation.) We are also interested in finding commentators for papers, so please let us know if you would have an interest
in commenting.

Thinking About Reasons
By Antti Kauppinen

Expressivist accounts of normative judgment typically (always?) begin with all-things-considered verdicts: Hurrah (helping old ladies cross the road)! Boo (getting your little brother to murder)! But of course, many normative thoughts are not all-things-considered. I think there is some reason for me to go to bed early, and some reason for me not to do so. When I deliberate, I try to figure out which of these is stronger, and so arrive at an all-things-considered judgment.

Here is a partial list of things that an account of thoughts about reasons should explain:

FICTIONALISM
15-17 September 2009
Chancellors Hotel and Conference Centre, University of Manchester

Tuesday 15 September
2-3.15 John Divers (Leeds) If You Don’t Succeed, At Least Pretend To: The Explanatory Poverty of Modal Fictionalisms

3.45-5 Mary Leng (Liverpool) Mathematical Fictionalism and Constructive Empiricism

5.30-6.45 Daniel Nolan (Nottingham) There’s No Justice: Ontological Moral Fictionalism

Wednesday 16 September
10-11.15 Jonas Olson (Stockholm) Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism

11.45-1 Mark Balaguer (California State, Los Angeles) (title TBA)

2-3.15 Anthony Everett (Bristol) Meinongian Fictionalism Reconsidered

3.45-5 Jussi Suikkanen (Reading) Saving the Moral Fiction: The Content Challenge

*** Evolution, Emotions, and Metaethics ***
2-day workshop at the University of Sydney: Aug 6-7
New Law School Seminar Room 340

THURSDAY AUG 6:

10AM – 11:15AM
Don Loeb (University of Vermont)
“Moral disagreement revisited”

11:30AM – 12:45PM
Janice Dowell (University of Nebraska-Lincoln)
“A flexible contextualist account of ‘ought’”

2:45PM – 4:00PM
Josh Gert (Florida State University)
“Wittgensteinian metaethics”

FRIDAY AUG 7:

10AM – 11:15AM
Justin D’Arms (Ohio State University) and Daniel Jacobson (University of Michigan)
“Interestingly wrong kind of reasons and the opacity of normative force”

Leeds is holding a really interesting workshop on issues concerning naturalism in moral philosophy and in metaphysics and epistemology. Definitely should check it out if you have the chance.

Workshop: “Naturalism: Ethical and Metaphysical”
University of Leeds
September 18-19, 2009

Registration for the workshop is now open. More details about the workshop and registration can be found at:
http://naturalism09.wordpress.com/.

The workshop begins at 2pm on Friday, 18 September, and ends at 4:15pm on Saturday, 19 September. The speakers are:

Sobel on Parfit on Subjectivism
By S. Matthew Liao

Professor David Sobel (University of Nebraska-Lincoln) gave a talk recently at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar on ‘Parfit on Subjectivism.’ A copy of the paper can be found here, and he would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:

Derek Parfit argues that all subjective accounts of normative reasons make wildly implausible claims. He rightly insists that we have reasons to get sensations that we like and to avoid agony now and in the future. Subjective accounts cannot accommodate this thought, he claims, because likings are importantly different from desires and because subjectivists are forced to give weight only to desires that the agent currently has. One might, even after informed deliberation, fail to desire now that one avoids future agony. So subjectivists cannot vindicate the obvious claim that we now have reason to avoid tomorrow’s agony.

Professor Russ Shafer-Landau has announced the program for the 6th Annual Metaethics Workshop, which will take place in Madison, WI on Sept 11-13, 2009, and which looks fantastic!

All sessions will take place in 313 Pyle Center (702 Langdon Street)

FRIDAY SEPTEMBER 11
9am – 10:15am JON TRESAN (Florida)
Naturalistic Moral Realism, Moral Twin Earth, and the Meta-Moral Use of Moral Words
Chair: Christian Coons (Bowling Green)

10:40am – Noon EARL CONEE (Rochester)
The Best Alternative
Chair: David Merli (Franklin & Marshall)

1:30pm – 2:45pm SARAH McGRATH (Princeton)
Moral Knowledge and Experience
Chair: Luke Robinson (SMU)