Readings
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Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation
Michael Strevens
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The Case for Contextualism
Keith DeRose
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When Truth Gives Out
Mark Richard
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The Idea of Human Rights
Charles R. Beitz
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Willing, Wanting, Waiting
Richard Holton
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The Idea of Justice
Amartya Sen
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Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem
Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman
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What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being
Richard Kraut
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Content and Justification
Paul A. Boghossian
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Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality
Stephen Yablo
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Normativity
Judith Jarvis Thomson
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How We Get Along
J. David Velleman
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Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity
Christine M. Korsgaard
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Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason
Sergio Tenenbaum
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Principled Ethics: Generalism As a Regulative Ideal
Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge
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Killing in War
Jeff McMahan
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Experimental Philosophy
Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols
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Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought
Michael Thompson
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The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory
David J. Chalmers
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Ethics: Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality
David Wiggins
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Disadvantage
Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit
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Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics
Allan Gibbard
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Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame
T. M. Scanlon
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The Philosophy of Philosophy
Timothy Williamson
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A Virtue Epistemology
Ernest Sosa
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Morality without Foundations
Mark Timmons
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Authority and Estrangement
Richard Moran
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Moral Psychology, Volume 1
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
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The Reflective Life
Valerie Tiberius
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Moral Literacy
Barbara Herman
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Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction
Dale Jamieson
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On Human Rights
James Griffin
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Experiments in Ethics
Kwame Anthony Appiah
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Reasons without Rationalism
Kieran Setiya
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Moral Realism: A Defence
Russ Shafer-Landau
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The Way We Eat
Peter Singer and Jim Mason
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Metaphysical Essays
John Hawthorne
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Knowledge and Practical Interests
Jason Stanley
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10 Moral Paradoxes
Saul Smilansky
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Normativity and the Will
R. Jay Wallace
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Ethics without Principles
Jonathan Dancy
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Neuroethics
Neil Levy
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Ideal Code, Real World
Brad Hooker
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The Nature of Normativity
Ralph Wedgwood
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Structures of Agency: Essays
Michael E. Bratman
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The Second-Person Standpoint
Stephen Darwall
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Ethics and the A Priori
Michael Smith
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The Practice of Value
Joseph Raz
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Weighing Lives
John Broome
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Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm
F. M. Kamm
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Reasons and the Good
Roger Crisp
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March 4, 2010
Spindel Conference 2010 Emerging Scholar Prize
By Julia Driver
Hi all, I just wanted to call your attention to the following:
Call For Papers
Spindel Prize for Emerging Scholar in Philosophy
2010 Spindel Conference Topic: Empathy and Ethics
Conference Director: Remy Debes
The University of Memphis Department of Philosophy is proud to announce that the topic for the 29th annual Spindel Conference will be “Empathy and Ethics.”
February 25, 2010
Smilansky on Should We Be Sorry That We Exist?
By S. Matthew Liao
Professor Saul Smilansky (University of Haifa) will be giving a talk on Monday, March 1, at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar entitled “Should We Be Sorry that We Exist?” A copy of Saul’s talk can be found here. Saul would welcome any comments/suggestions. Here’s an abstract of his talk:
January 15, 2010
Journal of Moral Philosophy 7(1) (2010)
By Thom Brooks
JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY:
An International Journal of Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy
(ISSN 1740-4681)
Volume 7, Number 1 (2010)
ARTICLES
William Sin, ‘Trivial Sacrifices, Great Demands’, pp. 3-15
Lina Papadaki, ‘What is Objectification?’ pp. 16-36
M. B. E. Smith, ‘Does Humanity Share a Common Moral Faculty?’ pp. 37-53
Jonathan Seglow, ‘Associative Duties and Global Justice’, pp. 54-73
Miriam Ronzoni, ‘Constructivism and Practical Reason: On Intersubjectivity, Abstraction, and Judgment’, pp. 74-104
Kenneth R. Westphal, ‘From “Convention” to “Ethical Life”: Hume’s Theory of Justice in Post-Kantian Perspective’, pp. 105-32
REVIEW ARTICLE
January 15, 2010
Journal of Moral Philosophy 6(4) (2009)
By Thom Brooks
JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY:
An International Journal of Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy
(ISSN 1740-4681)
Volume 6, Number 4 (2009)
ARTICLES
Ty Landrum, ‘Persons as Objects of Love’, pp. 417-39
Elizabeth Tropman, ‘Renewing Moral Intuitionism’, pp. 440-63
David Alm, ‘Deontological Restrictions and the Good/Bad Asymmetry’, pp. 464-81
Carl Knight, ‘Egalitarian Justice and Valuational Judgment’, pp. 482-98
Geoffrey Scarre, ‘The “Banality of Good”?’ pp. 499-519
REVIEW ARTICLE
Sean Coyle, ‘The Ideality of Law’, pp. 521-34
BOOK REVIEWS
Stefan Bird-Pollan on The Founding Act of Modern Ethical Life: Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy by Ideo Geiger, pp. 535-37
November 14, 2009
Continuum Ethics book series
By Thom Brooks
Continuum Ethics
A series of books exploring key topics in contemporary ethics and moral philosophy.
Continuum Ethics presents a series of books that will bridge the gap between new research work and undergraduate textbooks. They will provide close examination of key concepts in contemporary moral philosophy. Aimed largely at upper-level undergraduates and research students, they will also appeal to researchers in the field. Authors will be expected to combine philosophical sophistication with an accessible style that can engage the educated reader.
October 5, 2009
Sentimentalism and Moral Grammar
By Antti Kauppinen
In this post, all too long and speculative, I will examine how a sentimentalist theory of moral thinking could exploit and improve recently popular theories of universal moral grammar, developed by John Mikhail, Susan Dwyer, Marc Hauser’s group, Gilbert Harman and Erica Roedder, and others. I’ll be drawing mostly on Mikhail’s 2009 ‘Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence’, in Psychology of Learning and Motivation 50, 27–100 for moral grammar. The sentimentalist theory I sketch is my own, though heavily inspired by Adam Smith. It is independently motivated, but I believe it does a better job of explaining our intuitions than other views that highlight the role of emotions.
August 28, 2009
Conference on the Work of Onora O’Neill
By S. Matthew Liao
The British Academy, in association with the Centre de recherche en éthique de l’Université de Montréal, will be hosting an international conference on the work of Onora O’Neill, entitled “Ethics and Politics Beyond Borders: The Work of Onora O’Neill.
24-26 SEPTEMBER 2009
10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1
Convenor: Professor David Archard (Lancaster University)
Thursday, 24 September 2009
12.00 Registration
1.30 Session 1: The ethics and politics of global justice
Welcome and opening remarks
August 2, 2009
Roberts and Wasserman on Harming Future Persons
By S. Matthew Liao
Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem, edited by Melinda Roberts and David Wasserman, just came out!
From the back cover:
This collection of essays investigates the obligations we have in respect of future persons, ranging from our own future offspring to distant future generations. What are our obligations to persons who have not yet, but eventually will, come into existence? Can we harm them? Can we wrong them? Can the fact that our choice means that a worse off person will exist in place of a better off but “nonidentical” person make that choice is wrong?
July 7, 2009
Program for Arizona Normative Ethics Workshop
By S. Matthew Liao
This First Annual Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics takes place at the Westward Look Resort in Tucson, Arizona, from January 7 to January 9, 2010. Here is the program for it, which looks great:
Thursday January 7
5:00–6:30 pm KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Holly M. Smith (Rutgers)
The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs
Chair: David Schmidtz (University of Arizona)
May 14, 2009
Conference on Extensions of Justice, June 3-4, Hebrew U
By David Enoch
On June 3-4, the Law and Philosophy Forum at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem will hold an international conference on extensions of justice. The conference is organized by Prof. David Heyd. Speakers and commentators include Axel Gosseries, Avner De-Shalit, Lukas Meyer, Daniel Statman, Melinda Roberts, David Enoch, Gustaf Arrhenius, Re’em Segev, David Miller, Chaim Gans, Shlomi Segall, Efrat Ram Tiktin, Joshua Cohen, Yitzhak Benbaji, Daniel Attas, and David Heyd.
You can find the conference program, and other details (and soon, we hope, also the papers) on the conference website, here.
May 2, 2009
Parfit and the Priority View
By Mike Otsuka
An article by Alex Voorhoeve and me entitled ‘Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others: An Argument against the Priority View’ has just been published in Philosophy & Public Affairs. The article includes a link to this post ‘for remarks by Derek Parfit in reply to this article, plus the authors’ response’. Unfortunately, this exchange won’t be ready until after Parfit has finished his book On What Matters. So once you see that book for sale, watch this space for his response to our critique. See below the fold for an abstract of the article:
April 22, 2009
Conference: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams
By Ulrike Heuer
Center for Ethics and Metaethics, Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds
30 June to 2 July
Venue: University of Leeds, Devonshire Hall
Further information:http://williamsconference.googlepages.com/home
Registration:http://williamsconference.googlepages.com/registration
Programme
Tuesday, 30 June
9:30 – 11:15 Susan Wolf (UNC, Chapel Hill): ‘“One Thought Too Many”: Love, Morality and the Ordering of Commitment’
Respondent: Brad Hooker (Reading)
15 min coffee break
11:30 – 1:15 Philip Pettit (Princeton): ‘The Inescapability of Consequentalism’
Respondent: Roger Crisp (Oxford)
Lunchbreak until 2:15
2:15 – 4 Jay Wallace (UC Berkeley): ‘Regret, Justification and Value. Reflection on Themes from “Moral Luck”’
April 15, 2009
Workshop: Deference and Responsibility
By S. Matthew Liao
Centre for Ethics and Metaethics and Department of Philosophy
University of Leeds
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Venue: IDEA-CETL Building (8-12 Fenton St.), Seminar Room 1
Schedule:
2:00-3:45pm
Prof Matthew Hanser (UC Santa Barbara): “Deferring to Others”
3:45-4:15pm
Coffee break
4:15-6:00pm
Dr Helen Frowe (Sheffield): “Obeying Orders”
6:00pm-
Drinks and dinner at a local restaurant
April 15, 2009
CFP: Arizona Workshop on Normative Ethics
By S. Matthew Liao
The first Annual Arizona Workshop on Normative Ethics will take place in Tucson, Arizona at the Westward Look Resort on January 7-9, 2010. Keynote speakers will be Thomas E. Hill (UNC, Chapel Hill), Holly Smith (Rutgers) and Peter Railton (Michigan).
Professor Mark Timmons invites those interested in presenting a paper at the workshop to submit a 2-3 abstract (double-spaced) by June 1, 2009. Only one submission per person please. Abstracts will be evaluated by a program committee and decisions made in early July.
Further information about the Workshop, submission of abstracts, and location can be found on the Workshop website:
February 25, 2009
CFP: War and Self-Defence
By Helen Frowe
August 25th – 27th, 2010
University of Sheffield, UK
Keynote Speakers:
Frances Kamm (Harvard)
Jeff McMahan (Rutgers)
David Rodin (Oxford)
February 20, 2009
Pettit and His Critics Conference
By Thom Brooks
PETTIT AND HIS CRITICS
Saturday, 14th March 2009
Research Beehive 2.21
Old Library Building
Newcastle University
Philip Pettit is one of the most significant moral and political philosophers today. This conference will bring together new work on Pettit’s many philosophical contributions by three philosophers-Thom Brooks (Newcastle), Cecile Laborde (University College London), and Michael Ridge (Edinburgh)-with replies to each by Philip Pettit.
PROGRAMME
10.30-11.00am
Registration (tea/coffee)
11.00-12.30pm
Speaker: Michael Ridge (Edinburgh), An Opportunity for Expressivists? Sincerity, Belief Expression and Ecumenical Expressivism
Respondent: Philip Pettit (Princeton)
12.30-1.15pm
Lunch
February 8, 2009
Sweating Hard and Hanging Out: The Case for Diachronic Perfectionism
By Antti Kauppinen
Let us loosely define perfectionism as the view that well-being consists in the (enjoyable) exercise of the capacities that are distinctive of one’s biological species. A dog does well when it does the sort of things that exemplify dogness, and we people do best when we make use of our various human capacities – rational, emotional, social, physical, and so on. As Richard Kraut points out in his The Ethics of Well-Being, this need not involve any sort of dubious inference from ‘x is natural’ to ‘x is good’. Rather, perfectionism should be thought of as a theory that best unifies the phenomena we are trying to understand. We have a bunch of intuitions about cases, and perfectionism captures the ones that withstand scrutiny, the argument goes:
January 26, 2009
Journal of Moral Philosophy 6(1) (2009)
By Thom Brooks
Journal of Moral Philosophy 6(1) (2009)
JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY: An International Journal of Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy
(ISSN 1740-4681)
* Note: the JMP is now quarterly from 2009 *
Volume 6, Number 1 (2009)
Editorial
ARTICLES
Daniel Nolan, ‘Consequentialism and Side Constraints’, pp. 5-22
Maria Merritt, ‘Aristotelian Virtue and the Interpersonal Aspect of Ethical Character’, pp. 23-49
Liezl van Zyl, ‘Agent-based Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Action Guidance’, pp. 50-69
Sterling Lynch, ‘The Fact of Diversity and Reasonable Pluralism’, pp. 70-93
Yuval Eylon, ‘Just Threats’, pp. 94-108
January 21, 2009
Woollard on Doing, Allowing and Imposing
By S. Matthew Liao
Dr. Fiona Woollard from University of Sheffield gave a talk entitled “Doing, Allowing and Imposing” this past Monday at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar. Here is an abstract of her talk:
The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing states that doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. I offer a defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing using the idea of imposition. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing should be understood as a principle protecting us from harmful imposition. Protection from harmful imposition is necessary to respect persons’ authority over what belongs to them. Thus if persons do have authority over what belongs to them, the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing must hold. I end by considering how we could establish that persons have authority over what belongs to them.
January 19, 2009
On Human Shields and Excuses
By Antti Kauppinen
The recent war in Gaza has stimulated a lot of popular discussion about the moral implications of the use of so-called ‘human shields’, non-combatants who are in close proximity to combatants, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Much of this discussion has been very simplistic and transparently rhetorical. Nevertheless, there are interesting ethical issues arising in the context of asymmetrical warfare that we should be able to examine at a degree of abstraction from the contested facts.
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