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Readings
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The Reflective Life
Valerie Tiberius
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Moral Literacy
Barbara Herman
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Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction
Dale Jamieson
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On Human Rights
James Griffin
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Experiments in Ethics
Kwame Anthony Appiah
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Reasons without Rationalism
Kieran Setiya
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Moral Realism: A Defence
Russ Shafer-Landau
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The Way We Eat
Peter Singer and Jim Mason
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Metaphysical Essays
John Hawthorne
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Knowledge and Practical Interests
Jason Stanley
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10 Moral Paradoxes
Saul Smilansky
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Normativity and the Will
R. Jay Wallace
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Ethics without Principles
Jonathan Dancy
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Neuroethics
Neil Levy
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Ideal Code, Real World
Brad Hooker
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Self to Self: Selected Essays
J. David Velleman
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The Nature of Normativity
Ralph Wedgwood
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Structures of Agency: Essays
Michael E. Bratman
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The Second-Person Standpoint
Stephen Darwall
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Ethics and the A Priori
Michael Smith
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The Practice of Value
Joseph Raz
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The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life
Jeff McMahan
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Weighing Lives
John Broome
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Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm
F. M. Kamm
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Reasons and the Good
Roger Crisp
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May 8, 2008
Ethicists Write Longer Papers Poll
By S. Matthew Liao
On why ethicists tend to write longer papers, Saul Smilansky has proposed the following hypothesis:
1. Do many people NOT write short papers because they believe that (with the exception of Analysis) the journals insist on longer papers?
Do you have this perception? Do vote and let us know. I’m creating this post so that people are aware that there is a new poll. Please continue the discussion at Saul’s original post. Thanks!
Loading …May 7, 2008
Elstein on Is There a Normative Question?
By S. Matthew Liao
Daniel Elstein from University of Leeds gave a talk recently at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar on “Is there a normative question and if so, how can it be answered?” Here is an abstract of his talk:
A neglected debate in metaethics is between Kantian and Humean expressivists. Kantian expressivists like Korsgaard hold that there is a single normative question which metaethics must deal with, whereas Humeans like Blackburn hold that there are simply a slew of diverse normative questions, which are a matter for normative ethics rather than metaethics. I argue that that the counter-intuitive Kantian position can be defended by considering Copp’s normative regress argument, and I try to show how to understand Kant’s argument for the categorical imperative as a plausible response to this threat of normative regress.
April 28, 2008
Sayre-McCord on Metaethics for Blogginheads.tv
By S. Matthew Liao
Professor Geoff Sayre-McCord from UNC has recently recorded a chat with Will Wilkinson on metaethics for Bloggingheads.tv. Here’s the link to the diavlog: http://brainwaveweb.com/diavlogs/10593
Some of the topics covered are as follows:
* How to be a moral realist (03:36)
* What is metaethics? (04:38)
* What to do when your moral arguments fail to persuade (09:29)
* Can the fact that Hitler was evil help explain the Holocaust? (13:50)
* General moral principles in a world of diverse circumstances (17:04)
Enjoy :)
April 21, 2008
CF: Normativity and the Causal Theory of Action
By S. Matthew Liao
NORMATIVITY AND THE CAUSAL THEORY OF ACTION
One-day conference, 18 July 2008, 9am – 6pm Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, UK Conference venue: Clifton Hill House, Bristol
SPEAKERS:
Michael E. Bratman (Stanford): From goal-directedness to the agent’s rational guidance
Lynne R. Baker (Umass, Amherst): Agency and the first-person perspective
Roman Altshuler (SUNY, Stony Brook): Rationalization as causation and diachronic mental holism
Matthias Haase (Basel): Rule-following and conceptual capacities
Maria Alvarez (Southampton): The causal theory of action: reasons, motivation and explanation
REGISTRATION
April 7, 2008
Conference on Moral Particularism
By S. Matthew Liao
ETHICS WITHOUT PRINCIPLES: The Diversity of Contexts of Moral Particularisms
Date: May 10, 2008
Place: University of Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne – ExeCo Centre Panthéon : 12, place du Panthéon, room 1, 75005 Paris, France
Contact e-mail : a.c.zielinska@gmail.com
Conference webpage: http://meliparen.blogspot.com/
Keynote Speakers: Jonathan DANCY, Sandra LAUGIER, and John SKORUPSKI
April 2, 2008
BSET 2008 Schedule
By S. Matthew Liao
British Society for Ethical Theory Annual Conference 2008, University of Edinburgh, 14 – 16 July 2008
Speakers and Papers
1. Carla Bagnoli (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee): Practical Reflection and Agential Authority
2. Campbell Brown (University of Edinburgh): The Composition of Reasons
3. Krister Bykvist and Jonas Olson (Jesus College and Brasenose College, University of Oxford): Expressivism and Certitude
4. William Dunaway (University of Southern California): Minimalist Semantics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism
5. Barbara Herman (UCLA): TBA
6. Ulrike Heuer (University of Leeds): Wrongness and Reasons
7. Martin Peterson (University of Cambridge): The Asymmetry Argument
8. Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund University): TBA
9. Mark Schroeder (University of Southern California): Holism, Weight and Undercutting
10. Alan Strudler (University of Pennsylvania): The Distinctive Wrong in Lying
11. Jonathan Way (University of Californian Santa Barbara): Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason
March 31, 2008
Appiah’s Experiments in Ethics: Chapter 3
By S. Matthew Liao
In this chapter, Appiah presents experimental studies that seem to challenge our use of intuitions. He then outlines some responses to these studies. I shall begin with a summary of the chapter, using Appiah’s subheadings for easy navigation. I shall then offer some commentaries on this chapter.
March 15, 2008
CF: Raz on Value, Respect and Well-being
By S. Matthew Liao
Manchester Centre for Political Theory (MANCEPT)
Value, Respect, and Wellbeing: Themes from the Work of Joseph Raz
Friday 9 May 2008
Time: 9.30am - 5.15pm
Venue: The Boardroom, Arthur Lewis Building, University of Manchester
Provisional Programme:
9.30 - 10.00 registration
10.00 - 11.15 session 1: Steven Wall (Bowling Green State University)
11.15 - 11.30 coffee
11.30 - 12.45 session 2: Leslie Green (University of Oxford)
12.45 - 1.30 lunch
1.30 - 2.45 session 3: Brad Hooker (University of Reading)
2.45 - 3.00 tea
3.00 - 4.15 session 4: Stephen Darwall (University of Michigan)
4.15 - 5.15 session 5: Discussion with replies by Joseph Raz (University of Oxford and Columbia University)
February 27, 2008
James Griffin’s On Human Rights
By S. Matthew Liao
Professor James Griffin’s outstanding and important book, On Human Rights, has now been published by Oxford University Press. Professor Griffin is the White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy, Emeritus, at Oxford University, and currently holds appointments at Oxford, Rutgers University and Australian National University.
Dr. John Tasioulas (Oxford) has some wonderful remarks regarding Professor Griffin’s book, which he presented at Professor Griffin’s book launch on January 23, 2008, and which can be found here.
Professor Griffin’s address to the audience at the book launch, in which he shares his motivation for writing the book, can also be found here.
February 27, 2008
Brown on A Life Worth Living
By S. Matthew Liao
Dr. Campbell Brown from University of Edinburgh gave a talk recently at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar on “How to Live a Life Worth Living.” An abstract of his talk is as follows:
Although ubiquitous in population ethics, the notion of a “life worth living” resists easy analysis. Intuitively, one wants to say that a life is worth living just in case living it is better than living no life at all. On reflection, though, this seems mysterious. To live no life at all is simply not to exist, to be nothing. But then it seems we have an instance of the “better than” relation in which one of the relata is absent; we’re trying to compare something, a life, with nothing. This paper proposes an analysis of lives worth living that avoids such mysterious comparisons.
February 23, 2008
Live Blogging: Kamm Conference Day 2
By S. Matthew Liao
12:43PM Closing Remarks. Great conference! Great job by John Oberdiek, Jerry Vildostegui, and Jane Rhodes for putting this event together.
12:40PM Doug Husak: It’d be good to have a better account of responsibility, so that it is not being used to do so many things.
12:22PM Question: In Scan, Jim is actively finding out what the Captain is thinking. This is different from overhearing, as in Stated Intention Cases.
Frances: this distinction shouldn’t matter in terms of assigning responsibility.
February 22, 2008
Live Blogging: Kamm Conference at Rutgers
By S. Matthew Liao
5:42PM Reconvene tomorrow at 9:00AM. I’ll continue the live-blogging then. :)
5:31PM Tim Scanlon asks Frances: What is the motivation for ‘downstreamism’? If harm is downstream from greater good, then it’s ok. But the other way is not ok, according to Frances. Why?
Frances: harm is necessary to produce the good. (The word ‘downstreamish’ may someday end up in the Oxford English Dictionary). Why try to develop a theory at the start when five minutes later you may come up with another case that undermines the theory? It’s better to examine a variety of cases first before developing a theory.
February 19, 2008
Utilitas Special Symposium on Kamm
By S. Matthew Liao
The latest issue of Utilitas features three fantastic articles from a symposium on Frances Kamm’s Intricate Ethics and a reply from Frances. Kamm Aficionados especially should check them out :)
Off Her Trolley? Frances Kamm and the Metaphysics of Morality
ALASTAIR NORCROSS
Utilitas, Volume 20, Issue 01, March 2008, pp 65 - 80
Discerning Subordination and Inviolability: A Comment on Kamm’s Intricate Ethics
HENRY S. RICHARDSON
Utilitas, Volume 20, Issue 01, March 2008, pp 81 - 91
Double Effect, Triple Effect and the Trolley Problem: Squaring the Circle in Looping Cases
MICHAEL OTSUKA
Utilitas, Volume 20, Issue 01, March 2008, pp 92 - 110
February 18, 2008
New Blog: Practical Ethics
By S. Matthew Liao
Readers of Ethics Etc might be interested in a new blog called Practical Ethics, which “provides a daily ethical analysis of the latest developments in science, technology and other current affairs.”
The authors are drawn from researchers at three research centres at the University of Oxford, the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, the Program on the Ethics of the New Biosciences, and the Future of Humanity Institute.
What is unique about this blog is that the ideas expressed in the posts are intended to be one possible angle regarding ethical issues arising out of the new sciences, and DOES NOT necessarily reflect the opinion of the authors. Do check it out :)
February 14, 2008
Schedule for the Appiah Reading Group
By S. Matthew Liao
The Appiah Reading Group will start in early March. In each session, a commentator will provide a summary of a chapter and some points for consideration. The post will then be open for discussion, and we welcome your thoughts on any aspect of the chapter.
Some ‘off-line’ sessions will also be held in Oxford during this time. Please contact me if you are interested in attending the off-line sessions, as the numbers will be limited to ensure a smooth running of the reading group. ** Note: It is NOT necessary to have attended the off-line sessions in order to contribute to the online sessions. **
February 6, 2008
Holton on Determinism, Self-Efficacy, and the Phenomenology of Free Will.
By S. Matthew Liao
Professor Richard Holton (MIT) will be giving a talk on “Determinism, self-efficacy, and the phenomenology of free will,” this coming Monday, 11th February 2008, at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar, and he has kindly offered to circulate his paper before the seminar.
Abstract:
Some recent studies have suggested that belief in determinism tends to undermine moral motivation: subjects who are given determinist texts to read become more likely to cheat or to go in for vindictive behaviour. One possible explanation is that people are natural incompatibilists, so that convincing them of determinism undermines their belief that they are morally responsible.
February 6, 2008
Sinclair on Presumptive Arguments for Moral Realism
By S. Matthew Liao
Dr. Neil Sinclair from University of Nottingham gave a talk this past week at the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar on “Presumptive arguments for moral realism.” An abstract of his talk is as follows:
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